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A Gesture of Criminal Law: Jews and the Criminalization of Hate Speech in
Canada
Abstract
In June 2020, the fiftieth anniversary of the criminalization of hate speech in Canada passed with little
notice. Since their enactment in 1970, the hate-speech provisions in the Criminal Code have seldomly
been enforced. They are commonly viewed as ineffective. In light of this half-century of experience, it is
beneficial to re-examine the history of the criminalization of hate speech for lessons this story may hold.
This article does so by exploring the genesis of the legislation from the perspective of the Canadian
Jewish community. It focuses on the Jewish community because Canadian Jewry—especially the
Canadian Jewish Congress—was the primary driver behind the bill. Accordingly, a focus on the Jewish
community is essential to understanding why hate speech was criminalized, how the language of the
provisions was decided upon, and why they are infrequently invoked. Commentators have acknowledged
Jewish efforts, but the singular contribution of Canada’s Jews has not received full attention. This article
fills this gap. Relying extensively on archival research and oral history, this article’s central claim is that the
main goal of the legislation was not to prosecute hatemongers. Rather, its purpose was predominantly
symbolic: to enshrine equality principles in the criminal law and to send the message that Canada was a
multicultural and tolerant society. In fact, Congress leadership long resisted this type of legislation and
came to support a group libel provision only under intense pressure from its community grassroots,
especially Holocaust survivors, who demanded a forceful response to rising neo-Nazism. However,
Congress and other advocates of the bill were focused on the symbolism of getting the legislation passed
and were unconcerned with how it would later be used. In doing so, they ignored the vigorous protests of
Holocaust survivors who accurately predicted that the law would be difficult to implement. At bottom, this
is a tale of the risks and potential benefits of the symbolic use of the criminal law.
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In June 2020, the fiftieth anniversary of the criminalization of hate speech in Canada
passed with little notice. Since their enactment in 1970, the hate-speech provisions in the
Criminal Code have seldomly been enforced. They are commonly viewed as ineffective.
In light of this half-century of experience, it is beneficial to re-examine the history of the
criminalization of hate speech for lessons this story may hold. This article does so by
exploring the genesis of the legislation from the perspective of the Canadian Jewish
community. It focuses on the Jewish community because Canadian Jewry—especially the
Canadian Jewish Congress—was the primary driver behind the bill. Accordingly, a focus on
the Jewish community is essential to understanding why hate speech was criminalized, how
the language of the provisions was decided upon, and why they are infrequently invoked.
Commentators have acknowledged Jewish efforts, but the singular contribution of Canada’s
Jews has not received full attention. This article fills this gap. Relying extensively on archival
research and oral history, this article’s central claim is that the main goal of the legislation
was not to prosecute hatemongers. Rather, its purpose was predominantly symbolic: to
enshrine equality principles in the criminal law and to send the message that Canada was
a multicultural and tolerant society. In fact, Congress leadership long resisted this type of
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community grassroots, especially Holocaust survivors, who demanded a forceful response to
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*

Kenneth Grad, BA, MA, JD, LLM, PhD candidate (Osgoode Hall Law School). I am
grateful to Philip Girard, Benjamin Berger, Dana Phillips, Kerry Watkins, Colin Wood,
Kristen Lewis, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts, and to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Osgoode Society for Canadian
Legal History for research funding. I am also indebted to Michael Friesen at the Ontario
Jewish Archives, Janice Rosen at the Canadian Jewish Archives, and Andréa Shaulis at the
Montreal Holocaust Museum for their invaluable assistance.

376

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

symbolism of getting the legislation passed and were unconcerned with how it would later be
used. In doing so, they ignored the vigorous protests of Holocaust survivors who accurately
predicted that the law would be difficult to implement. At bottom, this is a tale of the risks and
potential benefits of the symbolic use of the criminal law.
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ON 11 JUNE 2020—AMID THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC and a disturbing rise in hatred

and xenophobia1—the fiftieth anniversary of the criminalization of hate speech
in Canada passed with little comment.2 The hate-speech provisions have not

1.

2.

Examples abound. See e.g. “COVID-19 pandemic unleashing ‘tsunami of hate,’ says
UNI chief,” CBC News (8 May 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/world/coronvirus-un-fearxenophobia-1.5561069>; Julie Posetti & Kalina Bontcheva, “Disinfodemic: Deciphering
COVID-19 disinformation” (2020) at 3, online (pdf ): UNESCO <en.unesco.org/
sites/default/files/disinfodemic_deciphering_covid19_disinformation.pdf>; Irene
Connelly, “Online anti-Semitism thrives around coronavirus, even on mainstream
platforms,” The Forward (11 March 2020), online: <forward.com/news/441421/
anti-semitic-coronavirus-response-thrives-online-even-on-mainstream>; Gerald Chan, “The
virus of anti-Asian prejudice,” Toronto Star (13 April 2020), online: <thestar.com/opinion/
contributors/2020/04/13/the-virus-of-anti-asian-prejudice.html>. See also Kenneth Grad &
Amanda Turnbull, “Harmful Speech and the COVID-19 Penumbra” (2021) 19 CJLT 1.
For a rare exception, see Jason Proctor, “The difficult history of prosecuting hate speech
in Canada,” CBC News (13 June 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/
racists-attacks-court-hate-crimes-1.5604912>.
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been widely enforced and, when invoked, the rate of conviction has been low.3
As William Kaplan writes, “If number of prosecutions and convictions is the
standard used for assessment, the legislation has clearly failed.”4 There is a general
view that the laws have been ineffective.5 Hate speech is far more widespread in
Canada today than it was a half-century ago. At the time of its enactment, even
3.

4.

5.

For the hate-speech provisions, see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 318(1), 319(1),
319(2) [Criminal Code] (in addition, ss 320 and 320.1 authorize in rem proceedings against
hate propaganda).
According to Statistics Canada’s Integrated Criminal Court Survey, between the 2009/2010
and 2017/2018 fiscal years, there were 53 completed cases (with “completed case” defined
as one or more charge(s) against an accused person that reached a final decision in court
or resulted in a guilty plea) in adult and youth court where the most serious charge was
classified as a hate-crime offence. Hate-crime offences consist primarily of charges under
ss 318 and 319, but also include a small percentage of charges under s 430(4.1) (mischief
against religious property). Of these 53 cases, 23 ended in a finding of guilt (43%).
To give a sense of proportion, during the same period approximately 3.74 million total cases
reached a decision in adult and youth court. Thus, the percentage of hate-crime cases out
of all completed cases was approximately 0.0014%. The rate of conviction for hate-crime
offences was even smaller—approximately 0.0001% of all findings of guilt—reflecting
the fact that findings of guilt in hate-crime cases are less frequent than the average rate
across all offences. See Greg Moreau, “Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 2018”
(26 February 2020), online (pdf ): <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2020001/
article/00003-eng.pdf>; “Adult criminal courts, number of cases and charges by type of
decision” (last modified 19 October 2021), online: Statistics Canada <www150.statcan.
gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510002701>; “Youth courts, number of cases and charges
by type of decision” (last modified 19 October 2021), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/
tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510003801>. See also Richard Moon, Putting Faith in Hate: When
Religion is the Source or Target of Hate Speech (Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 25,
n 15 (between 1994 and 2004 there were only 93 prosecutions under s 319, resulting in
32 convictions).
William Kaplan, “Maxwell Cohen and the Report of the Special Committee on Hate
Propaganda” in William Kaplan & Donald McRae, eds, Law, Policy, and International
Justice: Essays in Honour of Maxwell Cohen (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993) 243 at
266. Kaplan does note, however, that the legislation may be deemed a success if its goals
are more broadly conceived, which is an argument I return to in this article’s conclusion
in Part V, below.
See e.g. Moon, supra note 3 at 25-26; Andrea Huncar, “Far-right extremists getting
bolder as threatening behaviour goes unchecked, police warned,” CBC News (11 May
2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/ramadan-bombathon-edmontonmosque-far-right-extremists-police-charges-1.5564323>; Franklin Bialystok,
Delayed Impact: The Holocaust and the Canadian Jewish Community (McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2000) at 168; Jacky Habib, “Far-right extremist groups and hate
crime rates are growing in Canada,” The Passionate Eye (n.d.), online: CBC News
<web.archive.org/web/20210201094729/http:/cbc.ca/passionateeye/features/
right-wing-extremist-groups-and-hate-crimes-are-growing-in-canada>.
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proponents of the legislation acknowledged that the volume of hate propaganda
was low.6 Fifty years later, racist speech has risen to unprecedented levels,
aided by the ease of dissemination and anonymity provided by social media
and the internet.7
In light of this half-century of experience, it is worth revisiting the genesis
of the hate-speech provisions for answers as to why the laws have seemingly
had little impact. In this article, I provide one explanation: The legislation’s
primary aim was not to prosecute hatemongers. Indeed, Maxwell Cohen, who
headed the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda that provided the initial
draft of the legislation (known as the “Cohen Committee”), predicted that “it
may prove very difficult to obtain prosecutions or convictions” under the Act.8
Rather, its purpose was predominantly symbolic: to enshrine equality principles
in the criminal law and thereby send the message that Canadian society did not
tolerate racism. It should then come as no surprise—nor would it have surprised
the legislation’s supporters—that the laws have been difficult to use, and that
prosecutions and convictions have been infrequent.
The symbolic nature of the legislation can be illuminated through a history
of the campaign for the criminalization of hate speech from the perspective
of Canada’s Jews. I focus on the Jewish community because lobbying from
Canadian-Jewish leadership was the primary driver of the legislation’s enactment.
Accordingly, a focus on the Jewish community is essential to understanding
why hate speech was criminalized, how the language of the provisions was
decided upon, and why the legislation has proved unwieldy. Commentators
have acknowledged Jewish efforts in lobbying for the legislation, but the singular
contribution of Canadian Jews to the hate-speech provisions has not received
full attention.
6.
7.

8.

See e.g. Maxwell Cohen et al, Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada
(Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1966) at 27 [Cohen Committee Report].
See e.g. Tavia Grant, “Hate crimes in Canada surge with most not solved,” The Globe and
Mail (30 April 2019), online: <theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-hate-crimes-in-canadasurge-with-most-not-solved>; Habib, supra note 5; “Online hate speech in Canada is up 600
percent. What can be done?” Maclean’s (2 November 2017), online: <macleans.ca/politics/
online-hate-speech-in-canada-is-up-600-percent-what-can-be-done>; League for Human
Rights, “Annual Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2020” (2021) at 11, online (pdf ): B’nai Brith
Canada <drive.google.com/file/d/1IqrqxVoO0tCXxMxvC0_12rsSn5xPgMpu/view> [www.
bnaibrith.ca/antisemitic-incidents]. B’nai Brith, which has published an annual audit of total
antisemitic incidents in Canada since 1982, reported that antisemitic incidents reached a
record high in 2020 for the fifth consecutive year.
“The Hate Propaganda Amendments: Reflections on a Controversy” (1971) 9 Alta L Rev 103
at 112 [Cohen, “Reflections on a Controversy”].
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Although it is typically assumed that the Canadian-Jewish community was
united on the content of the legislation, there was in fact a deep doctrinal chasm
between Jewish leadership and the community’s grassroots, particularly the large
influx of Holocaust survivors who found refuge in Canada after the Second
World War. Canadian-Jewish leadership was initially lukewarm to hate-speech
legislation. The longstanding position of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC)
was that hatemongers were better ignored, not prosecuted. Although it had long
argued for hate-speech legislation, Congress advocated for the criminalization
of hate speech only insofar as it was connected to incitement to violence. Citing
freedom of speech, the CJC vigorously opposed a broader “group libel” bill
that would criminalize the dissemination of hatred whether or not violence was
intended or involved. Congress changed its position only after the disturbing rise
of neo-Nazism in the 1960s created intense pressure to shift course.
However, CJC’s dominant objective was to get a bill passed, not necessarily
one that could be implemented. Jewish leadership focused on what Parliament
and the Canadian public would accept and was unconcerned with how
the provisions might later be used. The CJC took pains to allay concerns
over freedom of speech, insisting on the insertion of broad defences into the
legislation and readily acceding to a requirement that no proceedings could be
instituted without the consent of the provincial attorney general. At the same
time, Congress discounted the objections of Holocaust survivors who predicted
that the legislation would be unhelpful in the fight against anti-Semitism.
This article proceeds in five parts. First, I situate this article within existing
scholarship on the origins of Canada’s hate-speech legislation. Second, I outline
efforts by Congress in the 1950s to lobby the government for legislation that would
restore protection for incitement to violence against groups. Third, I discuss the
rise of neo-Nazism and the renewed push for legislation in the 1960s, culminating
with the formation of the Cohen Committee in 1965. Fourth, I explore Jewish
lobbying and community tension during the legislative and public debate that
followed the government’s tabling of hate-speech legislation until its enactment
in 1970. I then offer some concluding remarks.
A few clarificatory comments may be helpful before proceeding. The goal of
this study is to outline Jewish contributions to the hate-speech legislation—an
account that is missing from the literature—as accurately as possible and to help
explain why the legislation has been infrequently invoked. I take no position in
the debate between Jewish leadership, which was skeptical of a group libel bill, and
the community’s grassroots, which demanded it. Viewed through contemporary
eyes, Congress may come across as uncaring of the Holocaust survivors or
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unreasonable in its advocacy for a weakened bill. We should be cautious with
such interpretations. Among other motivations behind their reticence, Jewish
leadership was undoubtedly concerned with sacrificing its hard-earned credibility
on a risky venture with uncertain benefits. This was a logical position to take—
squandering the community’s goodwill would make it harder to achieve other,
potentially more beneficial, legislative gains.
Furthermore, simply because the CJC’s civil libertarians reflected a minority
view does not mean they were wrong. Whether hate speech should be criminalized
within a legal order seriously committed to free expression is a difficult and
complex question, which has been addressed by others.9 Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Canada only narrowly upheld the offence of wilful promotion of
hatred—the heart of the hate-speech legislation—as a reasonable limit on free
speech in its 1990 decision in R. v. Keegstra (“Keegstra”).10 Thus, Congress was
prescient in its concern that the bill not go too far; legislation that further
impeded on freedom of expression would almost certainly have been later struck
down under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”). And on
account of Keegstra, a stronger bill appears impossible within our constitutional
framework, which suggests, as the civil libertarians had argued, that the fight
against hate speech must take place largely outside of the Criminal Code.
I will return to these themes in my conclusion. However, these issues, while
important, are outside the scope of this article and I leave deeper discussion of
them to others.

9.

See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press, 2012);
Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment
(Basic Books, 2007).
10. [1990] 3 SCR 697 [Keegstra].
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I. SITUATING THIS RESEARCH WITHIN THE RELEVANT
SCHOLARSHIP
Discussion of the genesis of Canadian hate-speech laws is scattered throughout
the literature. Several articles on the provisions appeared around the time of
their enactment, taking positions either for or against the legislation.11 Since
then, the topic has primarily received attention in two categories of scholarship.
The first pertains to the history of Canadian Jews. However, leading scholars
of Canadian-Jewish history—except for Franklin Bialystok, whom I address
shortly—give surprisingly limited attention to the hate-speech campaign.12 The
second is doctrinal literature concerning hate speech and freedom of expression
under Canadian law. These works often provide a brief overview of the Cohen
Committee and its findings, without going into significant detail regarding the
Jewish role in creating the Committee or obtaining passage of the legislation.13
Also relevant is literature on the history of human rights advocacy in Canada.
This scholarship pays significant attention to earlier lobbying efforts by the

11. See e.g. Walter S Tarnopolsky, “Freedom of Expression v. Right to Equal Treatment: The
Problem of Hate Propaganda and Racial Discrimination” in Special Issue, Centennial Edition
(1967) UBC L Rev 43; BG Kayfetz, “The story behind Canada’s new anti‐hate law” (1970)
4 Patterns of Prejudice 5 [Kayfetz, “The story behind”]; Mark R MacGuigan, “Hate Control
and Freedom of Assembly” (1966) 31 Sask Bar Rev 232 [MacGuigan, “Hate Control”];
Mark R MacGuigan, “Proposed Anti-hate Legislation – Bill S-5 and the Cohen Report”
(1967) 15 Chitty’s LJ 302 [MacGuigan, “Bill S-5 and the Cohen Report”]; Robert E Hage,
“The Hate Propaganda Amendment to the Criminal Code” (1970) 28 UT Fac L Rev 63;
Cohen, “Reflections on a Controversy,” supra note 8; Stephen S Cohen, “Hate Propaganda–
The Amendments to the Criminal Code” (1971) 17 McGill LJ 740.
12. See Gerald Tulchinsky, Canada’s Jews: A People’s Journey (University of Toronto Press, 2008)
at 460; Gerald Tulchinsky, Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish
Community (Stoddart, 1998) at 323; Allan Levine, Seeking the Fabled City: The Canadian
Jewish Experience (McLelland & Stewart, 2018) at 277-78 [Levine, Seeking]; Ira Robinson,
A History of Antisemitism in Canada (Wilfried Laurier University Press, 2015) at 133-34;
Harold Troper, The Defining Decade: Identity, Politics, and the Canadian Jewish Community in
the 1960s (University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 99, 106-07.
13. See e.g. Sanjeev S Anand, “Expressions of Racial Hatred and Racism in Canada:
An Historical Perspective” (1998) 77 Can Bar Rev 181 at 184-87; Ronda Bessner, “The
Constitutionality of the Group Libel Offences in the Canadian Criminal Code” (1987)
17 Man LJ 183 at 183-86; Bruce P Elman, “Combatting Racist Speech: The Canadian
Experience” (1994) 32 Alta L Rev 623 at 625-26; Martine Valois, “Hate Propaganda,
Section 2(b) and Section 1 of the Charter: A Canadian Constitutional Dilemma” (1992) 26
RJT 373 at 378-85.
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Jewish community to secure anti-discrimination laws, particularly in Ontario.14
But this literature pays very little attention to Jewish advocacy for hate-speech
legislation. Ross Lambertson, for example, claims that by 1960 Congress had
ceased to take a central role in the struggle for human rights.15 I will remedy this
misconception below.
There are three secondary sources that deal with the origins of the legislation
in detail, which I will build on in this article.
The first is William Kaplan’s article entitled “Maxwell Cohen and the Report
of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda” and contained in a collection
of essays in Cohen’s honour.16 Kaplan’s central contribution is his fascinating
insider account of the Committee’s work, drawing on archival research from
Cohen’s papers.17 Of particular note, Kaplan reports that it was Cohen,
alongside Congress, who approached the Liberal government about appointing
a committee to look into the criminalization of hate speech—not the other way
around, as many had assumed.18
The second is Allyson M. Lunny’s Debating Hate Crime: Language,
Legislatures, and the Law in Canada, which presents a semiotic analysis of the
hate-speech debate.19 Lunny’s focus is Parliament, and her primary resource is
Hansard. She devotes her first chapter to the legislative arguments that preceded
the enactment of the hate-speech provisions in the Criminal Code in 1970.20
Lunny notes that supporters tended to emphasize the symbolic nature of the
law, rather than effective criminal justice policy.21 Although I have supplemented
Lunny’s research with my own review of the legislative debates, her work is useful
for recognizing what the language used by parliamentarians signifies about their
underlying motivations.

14. See e.g. Ross Lambertson, Repression and Resistance: Canadian Human Rights Activists
1930-1960 (University of Toronto Press, 2005) at 196-242; Carmela Patrias & Ruth Frager,
“‘This is Our Country, These Are Our Rights’: Minorities and the Origins of Ontario’s
Human Rights Campaigns” (2001) 82 Can Historical Rev 1; James W St G Walker, “The
‘Jewish Phase’ in the Movement for Racial Equality in Canada” (2002) 34 Can Ethnic
Studies 1; Irving Abella, “Jews, Human Rights, and the Making of a New Canada” (2000) 11
J Can Historical Assoc 3.
15. Supra note 14 at 241-42.
16. Supra note 4.
17. See ibid at 244-56.
18. Ibid at 247.
19. (UBC Press, 2017).
20. Ibid at 30-55.
21. Ibid at 51-52.
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The third is Franklin Bialystok’s Delayed Impact: The Holocaust and the
Canadian Jewish Community.22 Bialystok draws on archival research and interviews
to chart the impact of Holocaust survivors and Holocaust memory in Canada
from 1945–1985.23 His work is vital to understanding the often-fraught relations
between Holocaust survivors and Jewish leadership. Unlike other scholars of
Canadian-Jewish history, Bialystok recognizes that “[t]he predominant issue in
the Jewish community in the late 1960s was the hate-propaganda legislation” and
devotes significant attention to this topic.24
Bialystok’s emphasis is on community relations rather than legal history or
doctrine, and I have conducted my own archival research and interviews to focus
on the latter as well as the former. In addition, I part company with Bialystok’s
analysis in two central respects. First, according to Bialystok, any disagreements
between the survivors and Congress regarding the content of the legislation “were
based more on misperception than on reality.”25 This is incorrect. The survivors
and community leadership fundamentally disagreed with respect to doctrine,
with the former desiring a group libel bill and the latter refusing to go any further
than incitement of violence. Congress changed position only amid calls for the
resignation of its leadership. Second, Bialystok suggests that once the government
introduced its bill in the fall of 1966 the survivors deferred to leadership on
the issue.26 Again, this is, respectfully, a misunderstanding of the situation. The
survivor community was unsatisfied with the draft legislation and felt betrayed
by the CJC’s decision to endorse it.
Thus, far from bringing the community together, passage of the hate-speech
legislation arguably left the Jewish community more divided than ever. I turn to
this history now.

II. BOUCHER V. THE KING AND CONGRESS LOBBYING IN
THE 1950S
In 1951, the Supreme Court of Canada curtailed the criminal offence of seditious
libel through its decision in Boucher v. The King (“Boucher”).27 Boucher was an
appeal by a farmer convicted for distributing a pamphlet that criticized the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Supra note 5.
Ibid at 6.
Ibid at 165.
Ibid at 153.
Ibid at 147, 167.
[1951] SCR 265 [Boucher].
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Quebec government, the Catholic Church, and “mobs” of Catholic lay people
for their persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses.28 The Court split over the definition
of “seditious intention” required to constitute seditious libel.29 In allowing the
appeal and acquitting the accused, the majority found that seditious libel must
include the intention to incite violence against the government.30 Only Chief
Justice Thibaudeau Rinfret would have applied a broader definition, which was
generally accepted at the time Boucher was charged, that included the intention
“to produce feelings of hatred and ill-will between different classes of His
Majesty’s subjects.”31 Justice Ivan Rand, reflecting the majority’s views on this
issue, found that the mere “baiting or denouncing of one group by another or
others without an aim directly or indirectly at government,” amounted to the
common law offence of public mischief, but not seditious libel.32
The decision in Boucher attracted the attention of the Canadian Jewish
Congress. The CJC, an umbrella coalition of Jewish organizations, was the leading
voice of Canada’s Jews.33 Headquartered in Montreal, it was divided into regional
components with each region allocated a number of representatives elected
every three years.34 Despite its purportedly democratic framework, Congress’s
agenda was controlled by a small group of administrative officials under national
executive director Saul Hayes.35 Until the mid-1960s, leading members of
Congress were drawn from a narrow group of men born or raised in Canada.
Immigrants, women, and Orthodox Jews were vastly under-represented.36
In March 1953, Congress sent a delegation to testify before a Special
Committee of the House of Commons tasked with a general revision of the

28. Ibid at 284-85, Rand J.
29. See Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 59(2) (seditious libel is defined as “a libel that expresses a
seditious intention”).
30. See Boucher, supra note 27 at 283, Kerwin J; Ibid at 288-89, Rand J; Ibid at 296, 301,
Kellock J; Ibid at 315, Estey J; Ibid at 331, Locke J.
31. Ibid at 276, Rinfret CJ.
32. Ibid at 289, Rand J.
33. See Levine, Seeking, supra note 12 at 338-45. Congress lost its position of primacy around
the early 2000s and was dissolved in 2011.
34. See Zach Paikin & James Gutman, “It’s time to bring back Canadian Jewish Congress,”
Canadian Jewish News (20 November 2015), online: <cjnews.com/perspectives/opinions/
its-time-to-bring-back-canadian-jewish-congress>.
35. See Troper, supra note 12 at 30-32; Levine, Seeking, supra note 12 at 339. Hayes was
executive director from 1942-1959 and national executive vice president from 1959-1974.
See “Saul Hayes Dead at 73,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (15 January 1980), online: <www.jta.
org/archive/saul-hayes-dead-at-73>.
36. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 5.
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Criminal Code.37 The delegation included Saul Hayes and Bora Laskin. Laskin,
then a professor at the University of Toronto, was introduced as Congress’s “expert
on the law.”38 Although Laskin was instrumental to the CJC’s anti-discrimination
campaigns in the 1940s and 50s, this was a rare instance of him taking a public
position on Congress’s behalf.39
The bill under consideration would abolish all common law criminal
offences, thus invalidating Justice Rand’s conclusion in Boucher that the baiting
or denouncing of one group by another would constitute the common law
offence of public mischief.40 In order to restore protection deprived by this
change and the decision in Boucher to narrow seditious libel, the CJC requested
two amendments to the Criminal Code.
First, Congress asked that Parliament add a new section after the seditious
libel provisions to criminalize incitement to violence against groups. Second,
it requested an amendment to then section 166 of the Criminal Code, which
prohibited the spreading of false news causing injury to “a public interest.”
Predicting the reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. Zundel, which declared the provision unconstitutional forty years later,

37. Although I have focused on the post-war period, Congress’s advocacy for criminal
legislation to combat anti-Semitic speech goes back further. In the 1930s, in light of a rise
in anti-Semitic literature produced by Canadian fascist groups, the CJC asked the federal
government on several occasions to enact legislation to combat racial hatred, including
amending the Criminal Code. A legislative proposal submitted by Congress in 1935 suggested
an amendment to then section 201 of the Criminal Code, which outlawed the disturbance of
persons assembled for religious worship (an analogous provision is now s 176(2)). Congress
reported that the Law Committee of the Senate approved the amendment, but the legislation
was abandoned after a meeting of the Council of Ministers. See David Rome, Clouds in the
Thirties: On Antisemitism in Canada 1929-1939, vol 2 (CJC National Archives, 1977) at 60,
68-69. In 1937, Congress wrote directly to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to
request that legal measures be adopted which would make libellous accusations against Jews
and other groups a criminal offence. King forwarded the request to Minister of Justice Ernest
Lapointe, who dismissed the idea. See Letter from HM Caiserman to WL Mackenzie King
(25 August 1937), Montreal, Canadian Jewish Archives (CJC ZA 1937, Box 1, File 16);
Letter from WL Mackenzie King to E Lapointe (10 September 1937), Montreal, Canadian
Jewish Archives (CJC ZA 1937, Box 1, File 16); Confidential Memorandum of AA Heaps
(17 September 1937), Montreal, Canadian Jewish Archives (CJC ZA, Box 2, File 23A).
38. House of Commons, Special Committee on Bill No 93, Evidence, 21-7, vol 1, No 2 (3
March 1953) at 58 (Saul Hayes) [House of Commons, Bill No 93].
39. Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005)
at 248, 266-67.
40. See Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 9.
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the Congress delegation argued that its wording was overly vague.41 Congress
suggested adding a new subsection to define public interest as including the
promotion of “disaffection among or ill will or hostility between different sections
of persons in Canada.”42
The delegation emphasized the narrowness of its submissions. Laskin stressed
that he concurred with the Court’s definition of seditious libel and agreed that
group libel (i.e., “produc[ing] feelings of hatred and ill-will between different
classes of His Majesty’s subjects”) should not be criminalized.43 As Laskin put
it, Congress was not suggesting “that people should be prohibited from talking
simply because they happen to injure the feelings of others.”44
The CJC’s recommendations did not make it into the revised Criminal Code
in 1955.45 Notwithstanding this failed effort, Congress did not view hate speech
as a pressing concern at this time.46 Moreover, its leadership felt that the best way
to deal with hate speech was to simply ignore it and not provide hatemongers
with any exposure—euphemistically referred to as the “quarantining” approach.47
Congress’s lobbying of the federal government in 1953 fit within its
broader push for human rights legislation that ramped up in the post-war
period. This campaign was carried out primarily through the Joint Public
Relations Committee of Congress and B’nai Brith Canada (JPRC).48 Formed
in 1938, the JPRC was a collaborative effort by Congress and B’nai Brith to
fight anti-Semitism.49 Representation was equal between the two groups, but all
41. See House of Commons, Bill No 93, supra note 38 at 57 (Saul Hayes); R v Zundel, [1992] 2
SCR 731 at 769-70.
42. House of Commons, Bill No 93, supra note 38 at 59 (Saul Hayes).
43. Boucher, supra note 27 at 276, Rinfret CJ.
44. House of Commons, Bill No 93, supra note 38 at 62 (Bora Laskin).
45. It is unclear why Congress’s suggestions were not adopted. For further explanation, see
Kaplan, supra note 4 at 269, n 4. Kaplan reports that “[i]n early 1953 the federal government
actually considered some draft legislation. However, the consideration was brief, and the
decision was made not to proceed” (ibid).
46. See Letter from Ben Kayfetz to J Alex Edmison (13 June 1952), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 5).
47. See e.g. W Gunther Plaut, Unfinished Business: An Autobiography (Lester & Orpen
Dennys, 1981) at 243.
48. See Michael Friesen, “The Joint Public Relations Committee Series at the Ontario Jewish
Archives: Some New Questions” (2019) 28 Can Jewish Studies 125 at 126. In 1962, the
JPRC changed its name to the “Joint Community Relations Committee, Central Region.”
For simplicity, it will be referred to as the JPRC throughout this article. In the late 1970s,
B’nai Brith ended its relationship with the JPRC, although the word “joint” was not dropped
until 1991. The JPRC was dissolved along with the Congress in 2011 (ibid at 127).
49. Ibid at 126.
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public statements were made by the CJC as the official voice of Canada’s Jews.50
As with Congress, leadership of the JPRC was insular and unrepresentative of
the wider community.51 For example, out of thirty-one members who attended
a JPRC meeting on 24 June 1965, only eight were born in Europe and none
came to Canada after 1926. It included “no survivors, no small businessmen,
no tradesmen, no women, no one under age thirty-five, and no representatives of
the Orthodox community.”52
The JPRC achieved some success during the Second World War, notably in
lobbying for Ontario’s Racial Discrimination Act (1944), but came into its own
after the war on account of a more favourable climate and the hiring of Ben
Kayfetz as its executive director in 1947.53 In Ontario, lobbying by the JPRC and
affiliated groups led to the enactment of the Fair Employment Practices Act (1951)
and the Fair Accommodations Practices Act (1954) and to the amendment of the
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act in 1950 to outlaw future discriminatory
property covenants.54 In fact, the Frost government accepted draft bills provided
by the Jewish community with little amendment.55 The JPRC exported its
techniques across the country and the legislation it successfully promoted in
Ontario was copied by all other provinces and the federal government.56
Congress’s post-war activism was successful but cautious. Jewish leadership
never demanded more than the government could give and in its legislative
campaigns advanced the least controversial proposal available.57 Some criticized
this apparent unassertiveness, but it had achieved results and Jewish leaders saw
no reason to abandon it. Events in the new decade would put increasing strain
on this approach.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Lambertson, supra note 14 at 201.
See Girard, supra note 39 at 248.
Bialystok, supra note 5 at 139.
Friesen, supra note 48 at 126; Girard, supra note 39 at 253.
Patrias & Frager, supra note 14 at 14-19; Walker, supra note 14 at 5-15. With the assistance
of Bora Laskin, the JPRC also sponsored legal challenges to the validity of existing restrictive
covenants. See Lambertson, supra note 14 at 211-14, 220-22, 228-37.
55. Girard, supra note 39 at 261.
56. Ibid at 248.
57. Ibid at 262.
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III. 1960–65: NEO-NAZISM, COMMUNITY TENSION, AND THE
COHEN COMMITTEE
A. “THERE’S NOTHING WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, IT’S A FREE COUNTRY”:
THE EMERGENCE OF NEO-NAZISM AND A RENEWED PUSH FOR
LEGISLATION, 1960–61

Despite Canada’s shameful record concerning Jewish refugees leading up to and
during World War II,58 many Holocaust survivors found a home in Canada after
the war. Thirty to thirty-five thousand survivors and their families immigrated
to and remained in Canada between 1945 and 1956.59 Holocaust survivors
constituted a high percentage of Canadian Jewry; by the late 1950s, 13 to 15 per
cent of the community were survivors (significantly more than the 4 per cent of
American Jews during the same period).60
The seeming rise of a worldwide neo-Nazi movement in the early 1960s
shocked Canadian Jews and particularly the survivors. On Christmas Eve 1959,
vandals painted swastikas on a synagogue in Cologne, Germany that had three
months earlier been inaugurated on the site of a Jewish shrine burned down by
the Nazis in 1938.61 Subsequently, anti-Semitic vandalism spread across the globe.
Similar incidents were reported over the next month in thirty-four countries.62
This anti-Semitic outburst reached Canada. In early January, fifty swastikas
were found painted on a Montreal building.63 In Toronto, among other incidents,
a swastika and the words Juden raus (“Jews get out”) were scratched into a plaster
cast at the Royal Ontario Museum, and the Bais Yahuda Synagogue in downtown

58. See Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe,
1933-1948 (University of Toronto Press, 1983).
59. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 73.
60. Ibid; Troper, supra note 12 at 26.
61. “Synagogue Smeared with Swastikas,” Toronto Daily Star (28 December 1959) 25; Joseph
Unger, “Germany’s Jewish Leaders Claim Police Did Not Protect Synagogue,” Canadian
Jewish News (1 January 1960) 1.
62. See Howard J Ehrlich, “The Swastika Epidemic of 1959-1960: Anti-semitism and
community characteristics” (1962) 9 Social Problems 264; “Swastika Wave Grows,” Toronto
Daily Star (4 January 1960) 1; “Swastikas Daubed in 13 Lands,” The Globe and Mail (6
January 1960) 4 [“Swastikas Daubed in 13 Lands”].
63. “Swastikas in Montreal,” Toronto Daily Star (5 January 1960) 1.
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Toronto was vandalized.64 Synagogues in other communities in Ontario and
British Columbia were also defaced.65
Congress preached caution. Its message to the Jewish community was
to ignore the hatemongers and not be alarmed. The vandalism was the work
of a “lunatic fringe” that was looking for publicity and it was important “not
to overestimate the doings of an obscure group of nonentities.”66 Indeed, the
anti-Semitic incidents in Canada and elsewhere appeared uncoordinated and
died out shortly after they began.67
The CJC’s caution did not sit well with some in the community. A group
of Holocaust survivors in Toronto demanded that Congress explain why it
was not being more aggressive—the first time survivors had openly challenged
Congress policy.68 Communal leaders responded by downplaying the events and
discouraging any form of vigilantism.69 In a letter to a concerned rabbi from
Sudbury, Kayfetz minimized the threat while emphasizing that Congress was
considering renewing its efforts at obtaining anti-hate legislation.70
Storm clouds gathered again in late 1960. On October 30, the CBC
dedicated an episode of its Newsmagazine program to neo-Nazism. It interviewed
George Lincoln Rockwell, head of the American Nazi Party, who claimed that
there were “two fairly large sections of the Nazi party” operating in Canada.71
Nine days later, Congress issued a press release reiterating its position that there
was no imminent threat.72
Holocaust survivors who viewed the CBC program were astounded that
Nazism existed in Canada and was apparently legal. In Montreal, a group of
fifty survivors discussed the program the day after it aired and decided to send
64. “Recent Swastika Craze in Toronto Abating,” Canadian Jewish News (15 January 1960) 1 at
8 [“Swastika Craze Abating”]; “Swastikas Daubed in 13 Lands,” supra note 62; “Swastikas in
Canada,” The Globe and Mail (9 January 1960) 6.
65. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 99.
66. Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Rabbi William Rosenthal (3 November 1960), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 7) [Letter from Kayfetz to Rosenthal]; CJC
News Release (10 January 1960), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series
5-4-6, File 7).
67. “Experts agree swastika spree not planned,” The Globe and Mail (26 January 1961) 25;
Martin Deutsch, “The 1960 Swastika-Smearings: Analysis of the Apprehended Youth” (1962)
8 Merrill-Palmer Q Behavior & Development 99.
68. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 99-100.
69. Ibid at 100; “Swastika Craze Abating,” supra note 64.
70. Letter from Kayfetz to Rosenthal, supra note 66.
71. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 103.
72. Ibid.

390

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

a delegation to meet with Saul Hayes. According to Lou Zablow, a Holocaust
survivor from Łódź, Poland, Hayes told them, “There’s nothing we can do about
it, it’s a free country.”73 Appalled by this response, the Montreal group, led by
Zablow, formed the Association of Former Concentration Camp Inmates/
Survivors of Nazi Oppression (“Association of Holocaust Survivors”). Adopting
the motto “Homage to the Dead, Warning to the Living,” its central aims were
to preserve Holocaust memory and counteract neo-Nazism. The Association of
Holocaust Survivors would become the largest and most influential Holocaust
survivor group in Canada.74
Even though Jewish leadership remained unconcerned,75 the CJC renewed
its push for legislative reform. In the summer of 1961, a Congress delegation
met with federal Minister of Justice Davie Fulton. Congress advanced essentially
the same proposal it had submitted in 1953.76 The meeting seemed to have gone
well; the Canadian Jewish News reported that Fulton was “very impressed” with
Congress’s presentation.77 In 1962, the Progressive Conservative government
referred the possibility of amending the Criminal Code to the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (CCULC). However,
as the CCULC deals with areas of provincial jurisdiction where laws differ among
provinces, it is a reasonable inference that the federal government was looking to
bury the issue. In fact, the Commissioners advised against accepting Congress’s
proposals and the government took no action.78

73. Ibid at 104.
74. Ibid; Myra Giberovitch, The Contributions of Montreal Holocaust Survivor Organizations
to Jewish Communal Life (MA Thesis, McGill University, 1988) at 96-97 [unpublished].
See also Interview of Ludwig Zabludowski (Lou Zablow) by Paulana Layman (28 August
1997), USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive (Segment 48). Zablow recounted
that “hearing of a neo-Nazi party being formed in Canada alarmed all survivors, who were
shocked to learn that there was no such thing as a law against [the] neo-Nazi party” (ibid at
00h:22m:42s). Upon founding the Association of Holocaust Survivors, Zablow discovered
that very few people, including Jews, knew anything about the Holocaust, prompting the
survivors to take steps to encourage Holocaust education.
75. See e.g. “Antisemitism Here Abating,” Canadian Jewish News (13 January 1961) 1.
76. Letter from Monroe Abbey & Saul Hayes to Hon E Davie Fulton (8 September 1961),
Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 14).
77. Max Bookman, “Parliament Hill Notebook,” Canadian Jewish News (27 October 1961) 4.
78. See House of Commons Debates, 26-2, vol 1 (24 February 1964) at 132-33 (Hon Guy
Favreau). See also Report on Community Relations (1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 33) [Report on Community Relations].
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B. “WE MUST KNOW WHAT SMALL AND FUTILE ENEMIES WE NOW HAVE”:
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF NEO-NAZISM AND CONGRESS’S RESPONSE,
1963–64

Although Congress had failed to obtain legislation, incidents of neo-Nazism
trailed off following the early 1960s, vindicating Congress’s position and easing
pressure on its leadership.
But neo-Nazism re-emerged in 1963, consisting primarily of the distribution
of anti-Semitic pamphlets and other material, much of which originated in the
United States.79 In May 1963, swastikas were painted on several Jewish communal
buildings and synagogues in Toronto.80 Perhaps most shockingly, on 11 November
1963, hundreds of leaflets were dropped from a downtown Toronto building,
each reading on both sides, “Hitler was Right” and “Communism is Jewish.”81
The neo-Nazi campaign intensified in 1964. For example, in February,
several hundred recipients, including synagogues, Jewish agencies, and communal
leaders, received a membership card to the National White Americans Party
(NWAP) based in Atlanta, Georgia. A cover letter explained that “[t]he NWAP
is a party of the Whiteman and…believe[s] in the superiority of the Aryan race.”
It advocated “sending all negroes back to Africa whence they came.” “On the
Jewish Question,” however, the NWAP stated, “our policy is much stricter.
We demand the arrest of all Jews involved in Communist or Zionist plots, public
trials and executions. All other Jews would be immidiatly [sic] sterilized so that
they could not breed more Jews.”82
Although Toronto was worst affected, other municipalities were not immune.
On 30 June 1963, in Winnipeg Beach, Manitoba, a man driving a sound truck
called out over a loudspeaker, “This is Adolf Eichman! All Jews must report for the

79. See e.g. Cohen Committee Report, supra note 6 at 12-24.
80. Report by Sydney M Harris–Community Meeting (1 December 1963), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 13) [Report by Harris]; “Swastika on a
Synagogue,” Canadian Jewish News (17 May 1963) 4; Dave Kagan, “Police Investigates
Vandalism,” Canadian Jewish News (24 May 1963) 6; “Swastikas in Toronto,” Canadian
Jewish News (31 May 1963) 1.
81. See Ken Lefolii, “Of course hate-mongering should be stamped out. But not by passing
censorship laws,” Editorial, Maclean’s (4 April 1964) 4, online: <archive.macleans.ca/
article/1964/4/4/editorial#!&pid=4>; Don Watson, “Hate From The Sky,” Canadian Jewish
News (15 November 1963) 1.
82. Letter from Col JP Fry (17 February 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17,
Series 5-4-6. File 11) [emphasis in original]; “Toronto Jews Bombarded by Provocative Hate
Mail,” Canadian Jewish News (21 February 1964) 1; Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Jack Baker
(4 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 24).
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gas chambers!”83 In February 1964, anti-Semitic material was mailed to students
at McGill University and Loyola College in Montreal.84 Hateful literature was
also disseminated in other cities throughout Canada.85
The avalanche of hate literature gave the appearance of a broad and
well-organized movement, disturbing the Canadian-Jewish community. However,
in reality, it was coordinated by a handful of people, led by David Stanley and
John Beattie, both based out of Toronto.86 Stanley publicly disavowed his views
in August 1965.87 Kayfetz recalled that he bumped into Stanley years later, who
admitted that he organized the leaflet-dropping incident in November 1963 with
a few other people at a cost of only twenty-five dollars, fooling Kayfetz into
thinking that it was a highly-organized operation.88 Beattie, whose antics will
be discussed further below, formed the Canadian Nazi Party in April 1965, but
it never numbered more than fifty and by the end of the decade had receded
into obsolescence.89
In response to the rise in anti-Semitism, Congress reverted to its
well-established playbook: Calm the Jewish community and work with the
authorities.90 The community, however, was not so easily placated. On 2 June
1963, two separate meetings were held by Labour Zionist groups in Toronto
to discuss the neo-Nazi situation. At the Borochov Centre in Downsview, with
more than six hundred people in attendance—mostly Holocaust survivors—
speaker after speaker railed against Congress’s alleged passivity.91 The situation
in Canada was compared “to that which prevailed in pre-war Germany when
the Nazis began their activities.”92 The attendees passed a resolution demanding
immediate action and threatening to take matters into their own hands. At the
83. “What happened in the west?” Canadian Jewish News (2 August 1963) 4.
84. “Nazi Underground in Montreal,” Canadian Jewish News (7 February 1964) 1; “McGill
Daily Revelations,” Canadian Jewish News (7 February 1964) 8.
85. “Some Facts about Neo-Nazi Leaflets” (9 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 14).
86. See e.g. Cohen Committee Report, supra note 6 at 27.
87. Ibid at 13; “After Stanley’s Defection, Complete Chaos in Nazi Camp Here,” Canadian
Jewish News (27 August 1965) 1.
88. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 111.
89. Ibid at 147-48. See also John Garrity, “My sixteen months as a Nazi,” Maclean’s (1
October 1966) 11.
90. See e.g. “Congress Committee Chairmen Confer With Toronto Police Head About
Anti-Jewish Vandalism,” Canadian Jewish News (24 May 1963) 1; “Cautions Torontonians
Against Swastika Panic,” Canadian Jewish News (7 June 1963) 1.
91. MJ Nurenberger, “Dybbuk in Downsview,” Canadian Jewish News (7 June 1963) 1.
92. Ray Gould, “Jewish Leaders Meet Continuously on Swastika Wave,” Canadian Jewish News
(7 June 1963) 1.
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other meeting on 2 June 1963, at Toronto’s Zionist Centre, a resolution was
passed urging Congress to take more aggressive steps and opposing any “quiet
politicking” on the question of anti-Semitism.93
Facing increasing pressure, Congress sought to reassure the community that
it had the situation under control. It organized separate meetings in Toronto and
Montreal on 1 December 1963. In Montreal, at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel with
seven hundred delegates present, a resolution was passed demanding legislative
action.94 In Toronto, at the downtown Young Men’s Hebrew Association in
front of four hundred representatives of various Jewish organizations, Sydney
Harris, national chairman of the JPRC, pledged that Congress would redouble
its efforts to secure legislative changes.95 Harris defended Congress’s policy of
not publicizing hatemongers and discouraging violence, arguing that a contrary
approach could backfire.96
As promised, leadership placed renewed emphasis on its legislative campaign.
In December 1963, a delegation including Hayes, Kayfetz, and Harris met with
Minister of Justice Lionel Chevrier to discuss the epidemic of hate literature.
Congress relied on the same legislative proposals it had previously put forward.97
Once again, this led to no significant response.
The survivor community remained unsatisfied. On 8 December 1963, the
Association of Holocaust Survivors held a mass meeting at the Young Israel of
Montreal Synagogue, attended by approximately one thousand people. The
Association adopted a resolution to push for the enactment of laws to prevent the
dissemination of hate literature. Milton Klein, the Liberal Member of Parliament
(MP) for the predominantly Jewish Montreal riding of Cartier, was in attendance
and pledged support for a bill to combat racial hatred.98

93. See ibid; Nurenberger, supra note 91.
94. D Goldman, “Demand Law Against Nazis–400 at CJC Conference in Toronto Warn Nation:
Don’t Tolerate Bigots,” Canadian Jewish News (6 December 1963) 1.
95. Letter from Meyer Gasner to Presidents and Secretaries of Jewish Community Organizations
and Congregations, Toronto (3 December 1963), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds
17, Series 5-4-6, File 13); Report by Harris, supra note 80.
96. Report by Harris, supra note 80.
97. “CJC Presses for Anti-Bias Laws,” Canadian Jewish News (3 January 1964) 1.
98. “Predict Ottawa Will Ban Dissemination of Hatred–Senator Croll, CJC Former Camp
Inmates Press for New Law,” Canadian Jewish News (27 December 1963) 1.
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As neo-Nazism intensified in early 1964, so did criticism of Congress.
On March 6, an editorial by Max Bookman99 appearing in the Canadian Jewish
Chronicle mocked leadership for its purported timidity. Bookman wrote that any
suggestion that “it is time for something more potent than talk immediately
horrifies Jewish leadership….[T]ime and again we have been assured: ‘see.
we’ve been successful, we’ve handled anti-Semites, no more swastika smearings,
no more vile propaganda, etc., etc., etc.’ Well, gentlemen, what excuse have
you got now?”100 Bookman suggested that if Congress could not deliver, the
community would have no choice but to resort to vigilantism:
It has been brought to our attention that certain cases of anti-Semitism in Montreal
were handled in a method which brought immediate results. We are not revealing
any details except to note that the end result smashed the Jew-haters in the only
fashion they really understand. If the “gentlemen” who are now handling the “fight”
against anti-Semitism in their manner can give us results we are on their side. But
if they cannot achieve even partial success then we suggest to them no hypocritical
tears if the Canadian Nazis or what have you are handled in a manner which appears
uncouth.101

The mounting criticism seemingly led to a change in Congress’s approach.
By then Congress knew who was responsible for the distribution of anti-Semitic
material, as it had infiltrated the neo-Nazi group through a paid informer.102
Congress leadership decided it would abandon its “quarantine” policy and
disclose this information to the community.103 On 9 April 1964, Harris gave
a speech to a crowd of more than one thousand five hundred people at Beth
Tzedec Synagogue in Toronto, at an event commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto
Uprising. Harris revealed that the neo-Nazi ringleaders were Stanley and Beattie.
99. Bookman was the founder of the Ottawa Hebrew News. He wrote syndicated columns
that appeared at one time or another in nearly all Canadian Jewish publications. See
Lewis Levendel, A Century of the Canadian Jewish Press: 1880s-1980s (Borealis Press,
1989) at 233-34.
100. Max Bookman, “Dateline Ottawa,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (6 March 1964), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 14).
101. See ibid.
102. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 124. In his memoir, W Gunther Plaut, Senior Rabbi of Holy
Blossom Temple from 1961-1977, recounts that in February 1964 an anti-Nazi committee
was created under Congress’s auspices and that this committee “monitored the Nazis and,
in co-operation with the police, placed an undercover agent in their cell.” Plaut, supra
note 47 at 242.
103. Florence Goldberg, “Canadian Jewry Acts: Move Against Neo-Nazis Here – Congress
Decides to Combat Hitlerite Agents in Canada,” Canadian Jewish News (21
February 1964) 1.
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Promising a more aggressive strategy, he stated that Congress had “for the time
being abandoned the policy that has said ‘Don’t publicize the hate-monger.’”104
Although Harris stressed that these would-be Nazis were so “insignificant in
stature and in meaning that we must know what small and futile enemies we now
have,” nevertheless exposure was required because “the ever widening tidal waves
of his influence, if unchecked by the barriers of public disavowal…may spread to
inundate our society before we recognize the disaster.”105
The goal of Harris’s speech was as much to satisfy Congress’s detractors
as it was to silence the hatemongers. Leadership remained concerned that
exposing anti-Semites would be ineffectual and would provide them with the
publicity they wanted.106 However, pressure from the community had built to
unprecedented levels and Congress needed to show it was doing something.
As Harris later put it, while exposure “didn’t shut [Stanley] up, it certainly satisfied
the community.”107 Indeed, subsequent events suggested the merit of Congress’s
position, as neo-Nazism continued unabated even after Harris’s address.108
C. “FOR GOD’S SAKE LET US FORGET THIS YICHUS BUSINESS”: THE
KLEIN-WALKER AND ORLIKOW BILLS, 1964

Despite Congress’s change of direction, many in the survivor community
remained skeptical of Jewish leadership. Impatient with Congress, the Association
of Holocaust Survivors worked on legislation outside of CJC auspices by directly
lobbying Milton Klein. Zablow met with Klein on several occasions in 1963 to
discuss the issue.109
On 20 February 1964, Klein introduced a private member’s bill in the House
of Commons. Entitled “An Act respecting Genocide,” the bill sought to make
genocide a capital offence and impose a minimum of ten years’ imprisonment
for anyone who inflicted bodily or mental harm with genocidal intent. However,
104. Speech by Sydney M Harris entitled “And Now The Facts” (9 April 1964), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 14) at 10.
105. Ibid; “The Wrong Court,” The Globe and Mail (11 April 1964) 6.
106. “Report on Community Relations,” supra note 78.
107. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 124.
108. See e.g. ibid; “Alabama Hate Publication Seeks Subscribers Here,” Canadian Jewish News
(5 June 1964) 1; “Nazis Defy Ottawa, Hate mailings from Scarboro continue – Clamour
For Anti-Hate Legislation Mounting,” Canadian Jewish News (12 June 1964) 1; “Canadian
Nazis & The New Year,” Canadian Jewish News (18 September 1964) 4; “Jewish Journal
Threatened,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (25 September 1964) 1; Letter from Ben Kayfetz
to JS Midanik (7 December 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series
5-4-6, File 17).
109. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 115.
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the bill’s most important clause was arguably its group libel provision, which
prescribed five years’ imprisonment for anyone who published statements likely
to injure a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group by exposing that group to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule.110
James Walker, Liberal MP for York Centre, co-sponsored the legislation,
which became known as the Klein-Walker bill.111 Walker’s riding included the
Toronto suburb of North York, which following post-war suburbanization of
the Toronto Jewish community, by 1961, was home to over forty-five thousand
Jews (up from only 3,989 in 1951) out of a total Canadian-Jewish population of
approximately 250,000.112
Also on 20 February 1964, New Democratic Party (NDP) MP David
Orlikow, representing Winnipeg North, introduced a private member’s bill
to amend the Post Office Act to deny use of the mails for disseminating hate
literature.113 Orlikow, like Klein, was one of only four Jewish MPs at the time and
represented a riding with a large percentage of Jews.114
Klein, Walker, and Orlikow sought to address the survivors’ two pressing
concerns: that Nazism should be declared illegal and that the government should
stop the unrelenting flow of hate literature. Many in the community were pleased.
A Jewish resident of Toronto wrote to Orlikow praising him for
the courageous stand you are taking in connection with the antisemitic litterature
[sic] distributed here. At last somebody has the interest and intestinal fortitude to
speak out loud about this very unfortunate social phenomenon.

110. See “Bill C-21, An Act respecting Genocide,” 1st reading, House of Commons Debates, 26-2,
vol 1 (20 February 1964) at 30 (ML Klein); House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Evidence, vol 3, no 34 (18 November 1964) at 1677 (John Matheson);
Bialystok, supra note 5 at 115.
111. House of Commons Debates, 26-2, vol 6 (17 July 1964) at 5658-60 (JE Walker).
112. “Jews of Toronto: New Statistics,” Canadian Jewish News (27 July 1962) 6. The total
Jewish population in Canada in 1961 was 254,368. See Mordecai Hirshenson, “Canadian
Panorama,” Canadian Jewish News (20 July 1962) 7. This was approximately 1.4 per cent of
the national population. See Troper, supra note 12 at 23.
113. “Bill C-43, An Act to amend the Post Office Act (Hate Literature),” 1st reading, House of
Commons Debates, 26-2, vol 1 (20 February 1964) at 32 (David Orlikow).
114. “Ottawa Still Has Four Jewish M.P’s,” Canadian Jews News (19 April 1963) 1. As of 1961
(and until about 1991, when it was surpassed by Vancouver), Winnipeg had the third-largest
Jewish population in Canada, at approximately 19,000. Orlikow represented Winnipeg
North, which was traditionally home to most of Winnipeg’s Jews, although much of this
population migrated south after the Second World War. See Levine, Seeking, supra note 12
at 260-61, 366.
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I have been in this Country for ten years, and whenever I discussed antisemitism
with some “leading” personality, suggesting that action be taken whilst there is still
time, I was always hooted down–“it can’t happen here”.–That’s what they said in
Europe a quarter of a century ago–and yet it did happen, and not in a backward
country either.115

In an editorial published on 21 February 1964, the Canadian Jewish News
endorsed the bills and applauded the Association of Holocaust Survivors for its
work at “the forefront of those in Canada fighting for the outlawing of hate
literature in the mail.”116 At an event held in the fall of 1964, Klein and Walker
received the Association’s “Man of the Year” award.117

SOURCE: Montreal Holocaust Museum Archives.118

115. Letter from George J Beer to David Orlikow (29 February 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 16).
116. “Time to Act–Anti-Hate Bill,” Editorial, Canadian Jewish News (21 February 1964) 4.
117. “Montreal Mass Meeting Told Anti-Hate Bill Okayed By PM,” Canadian Jewish News
(4 December 1964) 1.
118. “Lou Zablow at ceremony to honour authors of Anti-Hate Bill” (1964), Montreal, Montreal
Holocaust Museum Archives (2011X.359.57). Klein is on the far left; Zablow is second from
the right, shaking hands with Walker.
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The Klein-Walker and Orlikow bills were drafted without Congress input.119
On 24 February 1964, Kayfetz wrote to Ottawa to request a copy of the bills, which,
upon receipt, were sent to Laskin and the JPRC’s Legal Committee for review.120
Although Congress had been campaigning for hate-speech legislation for
over a decade, it did not voice support for either bill. This was a confusing and
disappointing response from the perspective of many of it constituents. Some
speculated that the silence was attributable to jealousy. Bookman bemoaned
the fact that the community finally had “a parliamentary measure which if
adopted, would give teeth to the law to take action against…the distributors
of anti-Semitic propaganda; and yet on this vital matter all we’ve had to date
from Congress is a deafening silence.” Quoting “one individual” who accused
the Jewish community of fighting over “who will get the credit for a measure
to combat hate propaganda,” Bookman pleaded, “For heaven’s sake let us forget
this ‘yichus’ business and let Congress get behind any measure which would curb
anti-Semitism.”121
But Congress’s discomfort with the bills was more fundamental: It did not
agree with them. Central to Congress proposals since at least 1953 had been a
link to incitement of violence; as Laskin told the Special Committee, Congress
did not think someone should face criminal charges for hurting the feelings
of others.122 The Klein-Walker and Orlikow bills were something different:
restrictions on speech untethered from risk of physical harm.
When reviewing the membership of the JPRC Legal Committee as of
March 1964, it becomes clear why its members would be uncomfortable with
a group libel bill. Indeed, two things are immediately apparent from its roster.
First, this was an incredible collection of legal minds. It included: Laskin,
the future Chief Justice of Canada; Harris, later appointed a provincial court
judge in Ontario; Harry Arthurs, future Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School;
Alan Borovoy, long-time General Counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association (CCLA); Edwin Goodman, founding partner of Goodmans LLP;
119. See “Why Congress Did Not Support Klein Bill,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (28 August
1964) 1 [“Why Congress Did Not Support Klein Bill”].
120. See Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Queen’s Printers (24 February 1964), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20); Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Bora Laskin
(2 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20).
121. Max Bookman, “Dateline Ottawa,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (17 July 1964) 6. The Yiddish
word yichus generally refers to family standing or lineage. Thus, in this context, Bookman is
criticizing Congress for its alleged insistence that advocacy for the hate-speech bill must run
through the CJC (with thanks to Nina Warnke for assistance with the Yiddish translation).
122. House of Commons, Bill No 93, supra note 38 at 62 (Bora Laskin).
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and Wolfe Goodman and Donald Carr, founding partners of Goodman and Carr
LLP.123 A future Justice of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Marvin Catzman,
joined the committee a short time later (Catzman’s father, Fred Catzman, was
also a member and had previously headed the committee).124 But the second
feature is more pertinent to the present discussion: This group had a markedly
civil-libertarian bent.125 The Legal Committee included two of the CCLA’s
founding members (Laskin and Arthurs) and its intellectual driving force for over
forty years (Borovoy). Harris would later author one of the most pro-freedom of
expression and generally civil-libertarian judgments ever written in Canada.126
Borovoy recalled that “[f ]or the longest time” he and other members of the JPRC
were in sync in their positions, which were increasingly out of sync with what
most of the community wanted.127
Congress leadership viewed the Klein-Walker and Orlikow bills as unjustified
infringements on free expression. As Borovoy put it in an internal memo to the
Legal Committee, “I have always opposed, as too great a risk to free speech,
any legislation which would curtail the right to propagate race hatred, unless
violence were intended or involved.”128 Laskin held the same view, writing
in 1964 that while no “constitutional or other protection should be given to

123. Letter from Bora Laskin to Members of Legal Committee (4 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20); Interview of Harry Arthurs (18 March
2020) [on file with author] [Arthurs Interview].
124. See Outline of Recommendations and Conclusions of Legal Committee Meeting (22
November 1966), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 41).
125. Arthurs Interview, supra note 123.
126. See R v Popert et al (1981), 58 CCC (2d) 505 (Ont CA) [Popert]. The Popert case concerned
a charge for mailing obscene material (then s 164, now s 168 of the Criminal Code) brought
against publishers of The Body Politic, a newsmagazine aimed at the gay community.
The impugned article, “Men Loving Boys Loving Men,” described sexual relations of
fictional men with young boys (ibid at 506-07). Justice Harris acquitted the accused,
but a new trial was ordered by the County Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal for
Ontario. For further explanation, see Interview of Sydney Harris by Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History (9 March 1995, 14 March 1995) at 117-20 [on file with author].
In explaining why he did not deem the material obscene, Harris noted that he brought his
“pre-judicial life into” the case: “I remember making some comparisons and talking about…
you want obscenity, the concentration camps in the war, that was obscenity. This isn’t
obscenity” (ibid at 119).
127. Alan Borovoy, “At the Barricades”: A Memoir (Irwin Law, 2013) at 98-99.
128. Memorandum from Al Borovoy to Legal Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress
(1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 34).
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incitement to violence…I have stoutly maintained that it is unwise to go beyond
incitement to violence.”129
Although hesitant to criticize Klein, Walker, and Orlikow directly, Hayes
conceded in an August 1964 interview—under pressure to explain Congress’s
stance—that there were “people in Congress, at leadership level, who feel very
strongly about civil liberties.…These people weren’t going to…back something
like the Klein bill.” However, Hayes also asserted, based on “inside information,”
that the legislation had no chance of passing and that Congress did not think it
prudent to expend its goodwill on a bill that was doomed to fail.130
This reasoning did not go over well in the community. Bookman lamented
that, “[a]s we see it, legislation will only be obtained over the dead bodies of
the civil rightniks” who “make out a most beautiful case on behalf of freedom
of opinion and speech and association; but let us remind ourselves that the
first thing Hitler did after taking the fullest advantage of these freedoms was to
deny them to everybody else.”131 The Canadian Jewish News was no less critical.
An editorial published on 4 September 1964 called Jewish leadership “Januses”
who with “one face proclaimed the necessity of adopting such a law, [while]
the other condescendingly rejected it as impractical.”132 A letter to the editor on
18 September 1964 applauded the editorial: “My friends and I, all very active
in the Jewish community here in Montreal, agree with you on the essence of
[your] criticism.”133
Bereft of Congress’s support, the Klein-Walker and Orlikow bills failed to
gain much traction in Parliament. Both bills were referred to a House Standing
Committee on External Affairs in October 1964. The committee held six meetings
but dissolved without completing its study when the legislative session ended
in April 1965.134 Congress submitted written testimony to the committee that
tracked its previous recommendations and did not endorse the Klein-Walker and

129. Laskin clarified that he was comfortable proposing an amendment to clarify the false news
provision. See Melvin Fenson, “Group Defamation: Is the Cure Too Costly?” (1965) 1 Man
LJ 255 at 273, n 67.
130. “Why Congress Did Not Support Klein Bill,” supra note 119.
131. Max Bookman, “Dateline Ottawa,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (16 October 1964) 2.
132. “Canadian Jewry–New Year Balance,” Editorial, Canadian Jewish News (4
September 1964) 4.
133. L Goldstein, “The Issue: Representation,” Letter to the Editor, Canadian Jewish News (18
September 1964) 4.
134. See House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings,
26-2, vol 3, no 39 (24 March 1965) at 1885-86.
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Orlikow bills.135 Klein and Orlikow reintroduced their bills in the new legislative
session, but the government did not refer them for further study and both bills
died on the order paper.136
D. “THE COMMITTEE…WAS SET UP TO SATISFY THEM”: CONGRESS’S
LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN AND THE FORMATION OF THE COHEN
COMMITTEE, 1964

Even as Congress distanced itself from these legislative efforts, it simultaneously
embarked on an aggressive campaign to obtain its preferred legislation.
In early March 1964, the CJC organized a letter-writing campaign to lobby the
government to enact legal protections against hate propaganda. Congress mailed
letters to the representatives of hundreds of Jewish organizations urging them to
have their members wire the Minister of Justice, Guy Favreau, requesting that
he take action, and to write their MP asking that they do all in their power to
combat hatemongers. Congress included different forms of draft language that
could be sent to Favreau or individual MPs.137 The JPRC files contain numerous

135. See CJC Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs
(18 March 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 33).
Although the proposal was similar to Congress’s prior submissions, it in fact went even
further in its concern that the legislation not unduly impede freedom of speech. The March
1965 submission to the Standing Committee now recommended an additional clause under
s 166 (the false news provision) that “[n]o person shall be convicted of an offence under
this section by reason only of having published statements relating to controversial social,
economic, political or religious beliefs or opinions” (ibid).
136. See Bill C-30, An act respecting Genocide, 3rd Sess, 26th Parl, 1965 (first reading 8 April
1965); Bill C-43, An Act to amend the Post Office Act (Hate Literature), 3rd Sess, 26th Parl,
1965 (first reading 8 April 1965). In addition to the Klein-Walker and Orlikow bills,
two other private member’s bills were introduced in 1965 to amend the Criminal Code
to curb hate propaganda, neither of which were passed. The first, proposed by Liberal
MP Marvin Gelber, would have expanded the definition of seditious intention to include
the wilful promotion of hatred or contempt against groups. See Bill C-16, An Act to
amend the Criminal Code (Disturbing the public peace), 3rd Sess, 26th Parl, 1965 (first
reading 8 April 1965). The second, proposed by PC member Wally Nesbitt, would have
expanded the definition of defamatory libel to include group libel. See Bill C-117, An Act
to amend the Criminal Code (Group Defamatory Libel), 3rd Sess, 26th Parl, 1965 (first
reading 15 June 1965).
137. Letter from Meyer W Gasner (2 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17,
Series 5-4-6, File 18).
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letters subsequently sent by community members to Parliament, suggesting that
many eagerly took up the CJC’s request.138
On 12 March 1964, a Congress delegation met with Favreau and other
government officials. The delegation submitted a brief emphasizing the rise in
neo-Nazism, calling attention to existing laws and regulations that might be used
to restrict the flow of hate propaganda, and requesting the same amendments
to the Criminal Code that it had previously advanced. Congress subsequently
reported that the meeting had gone well and that the ministers had assured them
they would investigate the matter. In fact, on 13 March 1964, Favreau stated in
Parliament that “the Jewish congress of Canada ought to be commended for the
very good presentation which they made,” and “that the material submitted and
the comments which [they] made…are already under study by my officials.”139
Additionally, Congress sent the brief to the premiers of all ten provinces140 and
to numerous MPs, including John Diefenbaker and Tommy Douglas, leaders
of the federal Progressive Conservatives (PCs) and NDP, respectively. Both
Diefenbaker and Douglas replied expressing support for government action
while not committing themselves to a specific proposal.141
Congress’s lobbying made an impact. On 26 April 1964, Prime Minister
Lester B. Pearson spoke at a dinner organized by the Montreal Israel Bond
Organization, telling a crowd of twelve hundred that it was the government’s
duty “to act against all those who advocate, incite or insinuate discrimination
or disseminate ‘hate’ literature for that purpose.”142 The next day, Secretary of
External Affairs Paul Martin gave a speech at Beth Sholom Synagogue in Toronto
in which he acknowledged the spread of neo-Nazism and told the congregation
138. See e.g. Letter from President, Beth El Congregation (Oakville, Ontario) to Guy Favreau
(9 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 16); Letter
from B Litman to Guy Favreau (9 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds
17, Series 5-4-6, File 16); Letter from Fred Sommers & Julius Miller to Guy Favreau (6
March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 16); Letter
from Bernard Leffell, Philip Shnairson, & Erwin Schild to Lester B Pearson & Guy Favreau
(10 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 16).
139. House of Commons Debates, 26-2, vol 1 (13 March 1964) at 873 (Hon Guy Favreau).
140. See e.g. Memorandum from Ben Kayfetz to Sydney Harris (31 March 1964), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 14) (indicating that various Premiers
had acknowledged the material sent by the Congress).
141. Letter from John Diefenbaker to Ben Kayfetz (16 March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 16); Letter from Tommy Douglas to Ben Kayfetz (16
March 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 16).
142. “Gov’t., Opposition for Immediate Action Against Canada neo-Nazis,” Canadian Jewish
News (1 May 1964) 1 [“Gov’t. Opposition”]; “No ‘graded’ citizenship in Canada–Pearson,”
Toronto Daily Star (27 April 1964) 1.
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that the government may introduce legislation if it could not deal with the threat
under existing laws.143 In addition, at a speech in Montreal around the same time,
Diefenbaker deemed hate literature poisonous, outrageous, and offensive.144
To bolster the legitimacy of its legal position, Congress retained two of
the most well-known lawyers in Canada, J.J. Robinette and Arthur Maloney,
to separately provide opinions on the prospect of successfully prosecuting
disseminators of hate literature under existing laws. In a memo to Harris on
1 May 1964, Robinette concluded that the present sections of the Criminal
Code were inadequate and that a criminal prosecution would be unsuccessful.145
Maloney likewise foresaw “grave difficulties” with a criminal prosecution under
current laws.146
Harris sent both memos to Diefenbaker and Favreau.147 On 5 June 1964,
in response to a question from Diefenbaker in Parliament, Favreau acknowledged
that he had read Robinette’s opinion and stated that “the matter is still being
actively pursued by my officers and myself, but a formula which will reconcile
freedom of thought and expression…has not yet been evolved in a manner which
is satisfactory to me.”148
Congress’s campaign made a breakthrough in the fall of 1964.
On 17 October 1964, Hayes and Congress President Michael Garber, along with
recently-appointed Dean of McGill Faculty of Law Maxwell Cohen, met with

143. “Gov’t. Opposition,” supra note 142.
144. “Diefenbaker Calls for Action in Canada Against Anti-Jewish Tracts,” Jewish Telegraphic
Agency (29 April 1964) 4.
145. See Letter from John J Robinette to SM Harris (1 May 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20). This was not the first time Congress worked with
Robinette. See Noble et al v Alley, [1951] SCR 64 [Noble]. The JPRC paid for Robinette’s
services as lead counsel in Noble in which the Supreme Court struck down a restrictive
covenant prohibiting the sale of property “to any person of the Jewish, Hebrew, Semitic,
Negro or coloured race or blood” (ibid at 64). See George D Finlayson, John J. Robinette,
Peerless Mentor: An Appreciation (Dundurn Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal
History, 2003) at 44-47; Girard, supra note 39 at 257-58.
146. Letter from Arthur Maloney to Sydney Harris (28 May 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20).
147. Letter from BG Kayfetz to John Diefenbaker (21 May 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20); Letter from Saul Hayes to Guy Favreau (29 May
1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20); Letter from
Sydney Harris to John Diefenbaker (8 June 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds
17, Series 5-4-6, File 20); Letter from Sydney Harris to Guy Favreau (8 June 1964), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 20).
148. House of Commons Debates, 26-2, vol 4 (5 June 1964) at 3976-77 (Hon Guy Favreau).
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Favreau.149 Cohen—McGill’s first full-time Jewish law professor and Canada’s
first Jewish law school dean—was active in Congress leadership.150 He also had
deep connections to the federal Liberals.151 Cohen served as a foreign policy
consultant to the government and had assisted Pearson in his successful campaign
for the party’s leadership.152 In addition, he was friends with then Minister of
Justice Favreau.153
The delegation of Hayes, Garber, and Cohen recommended that a “first-class
team” be assembled to study the hate-speech issue.154 The government accepted
Congress’s proposal. On 10 November 1964, at an event at the Sheraton Mount
Royal Hotel sponsored by Montreal B’nai Brith and flanked by Jewish dignitaries
including Klein and Hayes, Favreau announced that the government would
create a “small, informal committee of experts” to study possible measures against
hate literature. To a standing ovation, Favreau promised the packed audience
“that we do not intend to allow this challenge to our civilization to stand without
answer.” Favreau named the first two members of the committee: Saul Hayes and
Maxwell Cohen.155
In January 1965, Favreau announced that Cohen would chair the committee
and appointed the remaining members: Doctor James A. Corry, a constitutional
law scholar and Principal of Queen’s University; Father Gérard Dion, Professor
of Industrial Relations at Université Laval; Mark MacGuigan, Professor of Law
at the University of Toronto; Shane MacKay, Executive Director of the Winnipeg
Free Press; and Professor Pierre-Elliott Trudeau of the Faculty of Law of the
Université de Montréal.156 MacGuigan later recalled that the speed with which
the government acted and the fact that Hayes was appointed led him “to believe
that [the CJC] was the principal reason for the committee and that it was set up
to satisfy them.”157

149. Kaplan, supra note 4 at 247.
150. Sheldon Kirshner, “Cohen feels at home in academia, government,” Canadian Jewish News
(12 March 1981) 5; Ronald St John MacDonald, “Maxwell Cohen at Eighty: International
Lawyer, Educator, and Judge” (1989) 27 Can YB Intl Law 3 at 31.
151. See MacDonald, supra note 150 at 42-43.
152. Ibid at 43.
153. Ibid at 39, n 150.
154. Ibid; Kaplan, supra note 4 at 247.
155. “Favreau To Appoint Committee To Study ‘Hate’ Legislation,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (13
November 1964) 1; Kaplan, supra note 4 at 247-48.
156. Ibid at 247-48.
157. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 118.
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Although the committee’s personnel was finalized in January 1965, its report
would not be released until April 1966.158 In the meantime, tension in the Jewish
community would rise to a boil.
E.

“DON’T STICK YOUR NOSES IN IT”: JEWISH VIGILANTISM, 1964–65

Despite Congress’s hard work, anxiety continued to grow among Canadian
Jews over the perceived onslaught of neo-Nazism and the lack of progress in
suppressing anti-Semitism.
On 25 October 1964, on its public affairs show This Hour Has Seven Days,
the CBC again broadcasted an interview with George Lincoln Rockwell, leader
of the American Nazi Party. Sitting under a swastika flag, Rockwell declared that
Hitler could not have destroyed six million Jews and proclaimed his intention
to gas “queers and liberals” and send “Negroes back to Africa from whence they
came.”159 Understandably, many in the Jewish community (as well as the broader
Canadian public) were upset with CBC’s decision to give Rockwell a platform.160
The Association of Holocaust Survivors sent a memo to the Board of Broadcast
Governors expressing outrage that “tens of thousands of Canadian citizens who
suffered bodily and spiritually under the Nazi tyranny and who lost their closest
relatives in Nazi extermination camps should be insulted, threatened again and
their wounds reopened for the sake of cheap sensationalism.”161
Criticism was also directed at Congress. Although the CJC had known in
advance that Rockwell would be interviewed, it decided not to issue a statement
until after the interview aired so as not to place a prior restraint on free speech.
The Canadian Jewish News reported that it had been bombarded with “letters and
telephone calls directed against the Canadian Jewish Congress,” and that some
rabbis spent their Saturday morning sermons criticizing Congress for failing to do
anything to stop the interview. Canadian Jewish News editor M.J. Nurenberger
commented that in prioritizing freedom of speech, Jewish leadership had ignored
what the community wanted and thereby committed “the same fundamental

158. Kaplan, supra note 4 at 256.
159. Ibid at 253; Oscar Berson, “Reporters or Yokels?” Canadian Jewish News (30
October 1964) 1.
160. See e.g. “CBC showered with protests on Nazi show,” The Globe and Mail (26 October 1964)
12; “800 protests flood CBC over Nazi,” Toronto Daily Star (26 October 1964) 27; “Anger
against CBC erupts in Commons,” The Globe and Mail (27 October 1964) 11.
161. Memorandum presented to Board of Broadcast Governors by Association of Former
Concentration Camp Inmates, Survivors of Nazi Oppression (17 November 1964), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 30).
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error…that guided the [JPRC] to hesitate when the Klein-Walker Anti-Hate Bill
first was discussed.”162
Frustrated with leadership, some took more direct measures. In early 1965,
a group of Holocaust survivors and others created a vigilante organization to fight
the neo-Nazis. They called themselves “N3,” referring to Newton’s third law of
motion, that to each action there is an opposite and equal reaction.163 The group
felt it had to do something because Jewish leadership would not. Mike Berwald,
one of N3’s founding members, recalled that he had previously met with Kayfetz,
Harris, and J.S. Midanik (Chairman of the JPRC’s Central Region) but was told
“not to stick our noses in it,” that “it was [the JPRC’s] job,” and that they were
“doing everything possible.”164 N3 bugged meetings held at John Beattie’s home
and hired a private investigator to infiltrate Beattie’s organization.165
N3 was not the only group taking matters into its own hands. Several
high school students in Toronto formed the Canadian Organization for the
Indictment of Nazism (COIN). COIN operated a “defence element” that
gathered intelligence on neo-Nazis and managed to photograph Beattie’s files.
Cyril Levitt—now a professor at McMaster University, who has written about
Jewish history and racial incitement—was one of its founders. He recently
recalled that looking back, “we thought of ourselves in a more grandiose way
than I do today.”166
In addition, Michael Englishman—a Holocaust survivor from the
Netherlands—and a friend secretly attended meetings held by Beattie and
Stanley. Shocked by what he was hearing, Englishman began to record the
licence plate numbers of all attendees. He and his friend subsequently broke into

162. MJ Nurenberger, “Canadian Jewry–Crisis in Leadership,” Canadian Jewish News (6
November 1964) 1.
163. Memorandum from Ben Kayfetz to JS Midanik (1 February 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 34); Interview of Cyril Levitt (26 November 2020) [on
file with author] [Levitt Interview].
164. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 126-28.
165. Ibid.
166. Levitt Interview, supra note 163; Bialystok, supra note 5 at 128. With respect to Professor
Levitt’s work on Jewish history and racial incitement, see Louis Greenspan & Cyril
Levitt, eds, Under the Shadow of Weimar: Democracy, Law, and Racial Incitement in Six
Countries (Praeger, 1993); Cyril Levitt & William Shaffir, The Riot at Christie Pits (Lester &
Orpen Dennys, 1987).
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the neo-Nazis’ headquarters and stole their membership files.167 According to
Englishman, his desire to take action arose from Congress’s inaction:
I spoke with Ben Kayfetz and Myer Sharzer who both held positions within the
executive of the Jewish Congress. They told me that the Jewish Congress knew all
about it. I then asked what they were planning to do about it. Their answer was
that the position of the Executive was to do “nothing.”…I was flabbergasted at first.
Then I said to them, “you people have not learned a thing from the Holocaust.
Because what you are doing now is precisely what brought the Nazis to power in
Germany!”168

Congress did in fact know all about neo-Nazi activities, as they too were
surveilling Stanley, Beattie, and their associates.169 The JPRC hired several
informants to attend neo-Nazi meetings and record conversations involving
Stanley and Beattie.170 It passed on this information to the police.171
While it was monitoring the Nazis, Congress was also spying on the Jewish
vigilantes.172 The JPRC had at least two agents regularly attend N3’s meetings
and report back to Kayfetz, one of whom was accepted as a member of N3’s
executive. Kayfetz’s agents provided details about N3’s membership, plans, and
its views of Congress.173 Berwald claimed that Jewish leadership also bugged their
meetings; when N3 bought a bugging device to infiltrate the neo-Nazis, it picked

167. Interview of Michael Englishman by Karyn Farber (17 August 1987), Los Angeles, USC
Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive (Collection of the Sarah and Chaim Neuberger
Holocaust Education Centre).
168. Michael Englishman, “Neo-Nazis in Toronto” (1996-97) 4-5 Can Jewish Studies 120 at
121-22. In the quoted passage, Englishman was referring to the announcement that Beattie
planned a rally at Allan Gardens, discussed below.
169. See e.g. Announcement of Meeting at the Windsor Room, King Edward Hotel (1964),
Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 17); Sydney Harris,
Memorandum to file re campaign against hate literature (14 December 1964), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 30).
170. See Memorandum from Ben Kayfetz to Sydney Harris (1 December 1964), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 34); “Report re Mr. G.” from MS to
SMH, JSM, & BGK (18 February 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17,
Series 5-4-6, File 34); Garrity, supra note 89 at 11.
171. Letter from Ben Kayfetz to L McIsaac (7 December 1964), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 14).
172. Memorandum from Ben Kayfetz to file (25 January 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 34).
173. See e.g. Memorandum from Ben Kayfetz to JS Midanik re N-3 (5 February 1965), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 34); Memorandum from Ben Kayfetz
to JS Midanik re N-3 (9 February 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series
5-4-6, File 34).
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up the one Congress was using.174 Needless to say, there was a breakdown of trust
between leadership and the survivor community, which burst into the open in
the summer of 1965.
F.

“BUT A DROP IN AN ALREADY FULL AND BITTER CUP”: THE CONGRESS
PLENARY, THE RIOT AT ALLAN GARDENS, AND THE COMMUNITY ANTINAZI COMMITTEE, 1965

Two events in mid-1965 would place tensions between Jewish leadership
and its constituents on public display, and at last, result in a material shift in
Congress’s approach to hate-speech legislation. The first was the intervention by
the Association of Holocaust Survivors at the Congress plenary in May 1965;
the second was the riot at Allan Gardens and Congress’s response to the violence.
The fourteenth Congress plenary, held at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in
Montreal from 20 May 1965 to 24 May 1965, drew a record high of more
than eight hundred delegates. At the insistence of the Association of Holocaust
Survivors, a number of its members, in addition to Klein and Orlikow, were
granted delegate status.175
An intense debate ensued at the plenary over whether Congress would
recommend that the government adopt legislation linked to incitement of
violence, as the CJC had advocated for over a decade, or whether it would adopt a
broader group libel bill along the lines proposed by Klein and Walker. In a speech
on community relations delivered on 22 May 1965, Midanik offered a vigorous
defence of the civil-libertarian wing—arguing that the place of Jews in society
and the polity is best ensured over the long term by their support for the norms
and institutions of liberal democracy, including free speech:
I have been extremely perturbed [with]…the civil libertarians, civil-libertyniks
or the civil rightniks…being used…as a term of oprobrium [sic]. That to have a
concern for civil rights and a concern for civil liberties is apparently something
that Jews should not have when Jews are attacked. And I take the opportunity of
this particular platform in not pleading with you, but pointing out to you that the
Jewish community would have descended to an extremely sorry state if in fact the
term civil libertarian and civil rightnik was an epithet and a term of opprobrium

174. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 127.
175. “Montreal Delegates Ask for Klein, Orlikow on Program,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (7 May
1965) 1. Lou Zablow claimed that the Association of Holocaust Survivors and Klein were at
first denied entry to the plenary but were allowed in when they threatened to demonstrate
outside the Queen Elizabeth Hotel. See Bialystok, supra note 5 at 151-52.
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rather than one that should be treated with the respect for the concern of others that
it deserves. We should not forget ourselves and forget our own identity.176

In his address the next morning, Harris argued that the community was best
served by keeping in mind what the Canadian public would accept; asking for
too much might undermine the entire endeavour. As he put it, “If our proposals
cut down the freedom of Jehovah’s Witnesses or Orangemen, of Roman Catholics
or of Separatists, then our proposals will not be accepted by Parliament – and
no one should fool himself into wishfully thinking otherwise.”177 Klein spoke in
response, criticizing Congress’s leadership for its alleged diffidence and calling
hate literature an abuse of free speech.178
Harris proposed a resolution pursuant to which the delegation would
endorse Congress’s prior proposals on hate-speech legislation. However, the
Association of Holocaust Survivors moved from the floor for an amendment
supporting the Klein-Walker and Orlikow bills. The amendment was put to a
vote and carried by a huge majority, with only a handful of members, including
Borovoy and Midanik, voting against it.179 The survivors had finally succeeded in
making support for group libel legislation official Congress policy. Lou Zablow
later proudly recounted that the Association’s “resolution, although fought tooth
and nail by…most influential members of the Establishment, passed with flying
colours…terminating the era of the iron rule by so called civil libertarians who
were willing to give the Nazis the right to spread their venom.”180
The CJC’s reversal was received positively. In the Canadian Jewish News,
Nurenberger applauded Congress leaders for changing their minds.181 However,
any goodwill was nearly lost a short time later.
On 30 May 1965, John Beattie was scheduled to speak at a public rally at
Allan Gardens in Toronto. The announcement that Beattie would be holding a
rally reverberated throughout the Jewish community. N3 sent letters to Jewish
176. Speech by JS Midanik (22 May 1965), Montreal, Alex Dworkin Canadian Jewish Archives
(Fonds CJC0001, ZA 1965-2-14A).
177. Speech by Sydney Harris (23 May 1965), Montreal, Alex Dworkin Canadian Jewish Archives
(Fonds CJC0001, ZA 1965-2-14A).
178. Speech by Milton Klein (23 May 1965), Montreal, Alex Dworkin Canadian Jewish Archives
(Fonds CJC0001, ZA 1965-2-14A).
179. “Big Crowds at CJC Sessions, Sparks Fly at Hate Legislation Debate,” Canadian Jewish
Chronicle (28 May 1965) 1; MJ Nurenberger, “Commentary: Breakthrough,” Canadian
Jewish News (28 May 1965) 1 [“Breakthrough”]; Borovoy, supra note 127 at 100.
180. Lou Zablow, “Comments,” Voice of the Survivors (1966), Montreal, Montreal Holocaust
Museum Archives (2011X.41.91) at 3.
181. “Breakthrough,” supra note 179.
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organizations and synagogues calling for mass attendance.182 An anonymous
pamphlet informed “all Jewish youth” that they were “required, as a citizen of
Toronto and as a Jew, to be there, no questions asked by parents,” as “your lives
are at stake if these people become bolder.”183
As it turned out, Beattie never obtained a permit to speak in the park; had
he given a speech, he would have been arrested. He never got the opportunity
to do so. By the time Beattie showed up, a crowd of between one thousand five
hundred and five thousand people had gathered, including a large number of
Holocaust survivors. Beattie, holding a swastika flag, was immediately detected
and attacked. Another group of six youths wearing biker jackets—which turned
out to be members of a motorcycle club happening to pass by—were also set
upon. Police rescued the victims before any serious injury resulted. Eight Jews
were arrested, in addition to Beattie. N3 provided bail for the Jewish arrestees.184
Congress was very unhappy with this display of vigilantism, which
threatened to undo decades of careful progress. On 8 June 1965, Congress sent a
“communiqué” to approximately twenty thousand members of the Ontario Jewish
community, admonishing the vigilantes “in our midst, who are determined to act
on their own in dealing with the neo-Nazis with little regard for the consequences
to the community.”185 It continued:
The Canadian Jewish Congress accuses these persons and groups of irresponsibly
creating a tense and inflamed situation which…was bound to erupt into violence
and which unfortunately did so erupt; let us face it—the consequences of the riot
could have been more ugly, even tragic!
[…]
There are some individuals—fortunately very few—of these self-appointed shomrim
[guardians] who have mistaken noise for action and rabble-rousing for militancy
and who have not hesitated to turn an unfortunate coincidence into the occasion
for inflammatory allegations of anti-Semitic motivation.186

182. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 131.
183. Anonymous Pamphlet to All Jewish Youth (1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds
17, Series 5-4-6, File 11) [emphasis in original]. The pamphlet, though unsigned, stated that
it had “Rabbi Monson’s endorsement,” presumably referring to Rabbi David Monson of Beth
Sholom Synagogue in Toronto (ibid).
184. Bialystok, supra note 5 at 132; Englishman, supra note 168 at 122-23.
185. CJC Report on Neo-Nazism and Hate Literature (8 June 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 24).
186. Ibid [emphasis in original]; “Jewish Congress Blames Jews for Fomenting Mob Violence,”
The Globe and Mail (9 June 1965) 1 [“Congress Blames Jews”].
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Predictably, the statement was not well received. A note from a Toronto resident
attached to the communiqué in the JPRC files is indicative:
It is disgusting and very much disappointment [sic] in reading this letter. You
are acting in such a passive way as during the war when 6 million Jews were
slaughtered and you were afraid to raise your voice because this might embarrass
the government.187

Congress received a flood of similar criticism. The Association of Holocaust
Survivors called for the immediate resignation of those responsible for the
“malicious and unjust” statement, blaming this “deplorable and foolish act” on “the
rancor of the handful of opponents of the recent plenary session resolution,” who
were looking to avenge their defeat on the question of group libel legislation.188
Likewise, a resolution passed by the Conference of Jewish Folk Organizations
and Survivors of Concentration Camps in Toronto called Congress’s statement
“an insult to the feelings of thousands of Jewish people in our city” and demanded
its withdrawal and the resignation of all responsible parties.189
In response to the backlash, on 7 July 1965, the CJC held a community
meeting at Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto, chaired by Rabbi W. Gunther
Plaut.190 The meeting was designed to alleviate tensions caused by the
communiqué, which, in Rabbi Plaut’s words, had “set the already smouldering
Jewish community fully ablaze.”191 Plaut recalled that the voices of protest had
become so loud “that the very continuance of Congress, at least in Toronto,

187. Handwritten Note from Samuel Panik (11 June 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 24).
188. “Congress Statement On Toronto Riot–Concentration Camp Survivors Demand
Resignations Of Responsible Parties,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (18 June 1965) 1.
189. Resolution of Conference of Jewish Folk Organizations and Survivors of Concentration
Camps (22 June 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 49).
Making matters worse, the communiqué was leaked to The Globe and Mail before it reached
its recipients. See “Congress Blames Jews,” supra note 186; Bialystok, supra note 5 at 136.
Many other newspapers picked up the story and ran similar headlines. See Letter from Ben
Kayfetz to JS Midanik (22 June 1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series
5-4-6, File 11).
190. Rabbi Plaut would go on to serve as president of Congress and Vice-Chair of the Ontario
Human Rights Commission. See Ron Csillag, “Scholar urged Jews to engage larger world,”
The Globe and Mail (14 February 2012) S8.
191. Plaut, supra note 47 at 244.
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was in jeopardy.”192 Approximately eight hundred people attended the meeting,
which lasted five hours.193
Plaut opened by declaring, “[T]he first thing that we must understand is
that we are here tonight not to fight Jews but to fight Nazis.”194 Nevertheless,
tension was palpable between Holocaust survivors and community leadership.
Cyril Levitt, who attended the meeting, recalled that the atmosphere was “pretty
raucous,” and people were “really angry.”195 Numerous attendees rose to excoriate
Congress leadership and praise the vigilantes at Allan Gardens. One Holocaust
survivor called the Congress communiqué “a tremendous offense to those who
went through the hells and agony of Nazism.”196 Sabina Citron—an honorary
secretary of the Association of Holocaust Survivors, who would gain prominence
over the ensuing years through her quest to have Ernst Zundel prosecuted—
tied Congress’s insensitivity to its failure to support legislation on group libel.197
Citron reminded the audience that it was the survivors who had lobbied for
the Klein-Walker bill and that “Congress refused to have anything to do with
it.” It was only “after a year and a half ’s struggle and under the pressure of all
but 4 delegates to the Plenary Session [that] the Klein-Walker bill was finally
taken under the wings of Congress.” Thus, Citron noted, “[w]e should make
it absolutely clear that the letter in itself was but a drop in an already full and
bitter cup.”198 Responding to Citron and others, Midanik defended both the
communiqué and his position on the legislation:
I don’t retreat from my position at all on the question of group libel or on the
question that came up at the Plenary Session. I have a right to a viewpoint and I
have a right to a defence of civil liberties and I have a right to be convinced that I am
right even though I am a group of four people.199

192. Ibid at 244.
193. See ibid at 244-45. Only delegates who had attended the fourteenth plenary and presidents
of organizations and congregations of the Toronto Jewish community were invited. But when
a much larger crowd showed up, Plaut ruled that all Jews concerned with the welfare of the
community were entitled to participate.
194. Transcript of community meeting at Holy Blossom Temple (7 July 1965), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 32) [Meeting at Holy Blossom].
195. Levitt Interview, supra note 163.
196. Meeting at Holy Blossom, supra note 194.
197. Ibid. See also Sabina Citron, “The Anti-Hate Legislation: What it Really Signifies,” Voice of
the Survivors (1966) at 6, Montreal, Montreal Holocaust Museum Archives (2011X.41.91).
198. Meeting at Holy Blossom, supra note 194.
199. Ibid.
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However, a resolution passed at the 7 July 1965 meeting would further marginalize
the civil libertarians. Under pressure to incorporate a broader perspective into
Congress’s response to neo-Nazism, it was resolved that a “democratic and widely
representative” special committee be established to formulate the community’s
position.200 The composition of this group, which came to be known as the
Community Anti-Nazi Committee (CANC), was decided at a subsequent
meeting on 22 July 1964. Although operating under the aegis of Congress,
only fourteen of its eighty members would come from the CJC and B’nai Brith.
The remaining members were chosen by a cross-section of Jewish community
organizations, including synagogue congregations of all stripes, labour groups,
Zionists, women’s organizations, youth groups, and landsmanshaftn (Jewish
fraternal societies).201
The CANC acted in an advisory capacity and its specific impact on
Congress policy can be difficult to pinpoint.202 Indeed, as set out below, the
CANC’s formation did not prevent disagreement in the years to come between
Congress leadership and Holocaust survivors over the content of the hate-speech
legislation. Rather, it further entrenched support for a group libel bill of some
form. Congress had crossed the Rubicon and there would be no turning back.
Levitt, who served as one of the committee’s youth representatives, noted that
the CANC’s creation was a seminal event—“a kind of opening of the door–the
bowing to the pressure to bring [the newcomers] into the inner circle.”203
But although Jewish leadership was now firmly behind the advancement of a
group libel bill, its precise content remained an open question.

IV. 1965–1970: “FINALLY: ANTI-HATE BILL”204
A. OVERVIEW

The bulk of the Cohen Committee’s findings were agreed on in July 1965 and
the report was completed and sent to the government in November 1965. It was
released in April 1966. In November 1966, the government tabled legislation

200. Ibid.
201. Memorandum from Myer Sharzer to BG Kayfetz re Special Steering Committee (3 August
1965), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 32).
202. See Bialystok, supra note 5 at 142-43.
203. Levitt Interview, supra note 163.
204. See Canadian Jewish News (21 November 1969) 1.
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in the Senate that was virtually identical to what the Cohen Committee
had recommended.205
The Cohen Committee’s recommendations and the government’s proposed
legislation tracked closer to the Klein-Walker bill than Congress’s earlier proposals.
The bill outlawed three things: first, advocacy or promotion of genocide (section
267A; now section 318); second, incitement of violence or hatred against an
identifiable group through public communication, where such incitement was
likely to lead to a breach of the peace (section 267B(1); now section 319(1)); third,
a group libel provision, proscribing the wilful promotion of hatred or contempt
against an identifiable group (section 267B(2); now section 319(2)). In addition,
the legislation authorized in rem proceedings to seize hate propaganda (section
267C; now section 320).206
The offence of wilful promotion of hatred, which was punishable by up to
two years’ imprisonment, contained two defences. No person could be convicted
if they established that: (a) the statements were true; or (b) the statements were
relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the
public benefit, and that on reasonable grounds they believed them to be true.207
Harvey Yarosky, then a young criminal lawyer and one of Maxwell Cohen’s
former students at McGill University, served on the committee as Cohen’s
executive assistant. He provided criminal law expertise and invaluable research on
hate propaganda and legislation in other countries and assisted with drafting the
report. According to Yarosky, the committee’s members came to their task with
no preconceived notions as to the necessity of hate-speech legislation. Indeed,
many were concerned about the impact of such legislation on civil liberties
and the question of whether criminalization of hate speech would prove an
effective deterrent. However, after further study and review of racist material, the
committee gradually came to a unanimous opinion on the need for a hate-speech
bill. Yarosky remembered one committee member commenting that he had never
realized how hurtful hate speech was for targeted groups.208
It was understood by the other committee members that Saul Hayes spoke
for the Jewish community.209 Undoubtedly influenced by the shift in Congress
policy, Hayes signed on to the Cohen Committee’s opinion and would have
205. Kaplan, supra note 4 at 254-59, 272, n 61.
206. Bill S-49, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, 1st Sess, 27th Parl, 1966 (first reading 7
November 1966) at 1-2.
207. Ibid at 2.
208. Interview of Harvey Yarosky (30 November 2020) [on file with author] [Yarosky Interview].
See also Kaplan, supra note 4 at 255.
209. Yarosky Interview, supra note 208.
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gone further; Hayes objected to the insertion of the defence of truth in section
267B(2). His dissent on this issue was noted in a footnote.210 The report was
otherwise unanimous.
Although the government introduced draft legislation in 1966, it was not
passed until four years later, reflecting the considerable opposition to the bill—as
Harris and others had warned. The legislation originally introduced in November
1966 was referred to a special joint committee of the Senate and House of
Commons; however, the legislative session ended without the bill’s consideration.
The government reintroduced the legislation in May 1967 as Bill S-5, and in
November 1967, the bill was referred to a Senate committee. That committee
met three times but dissolved in 1968 in advance of the June election, which
re-elected a Liberal government under its new leader, Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Due
to a recent redrawing of its boundaries, Trudeau’s Mount Royal riding became 38
per cent Jewish—making it Canada’s most Jewish riding—further incentivizing
him to ensure the legislation was enacted.211
The bill was introduced again in December 1968 as Bill S-21 and referred to
another senate committee in February 1969. Bill S-21 passed the Senate in June
1969, only to die when Parliament was prorogued later that same month. The
legislation was then introduced in the House of Commons in October 1969 and
passed in April 1970.212 After further debate in the Senate—and a last-minute
attempt by the legislation’s opponents to refer the question of its constitutionality
under the Bill of Rights to the Supreme Court of Canada—it received Royal
Assent on 11 June 1970.213
The legislation was amended along the way and weakened in several respects.
Perhaps most importantly, a provision was inserted requiring the consent of the
attorney general of a province to initiate a prosecution for wilful promotion of
hatred or advocating genocide. Furthermore, private conversations were exempted
from liability under section 267B(2). In addition, two defences were added to
wilful promotion of hatred, protecting persons who, in good faith, expressed an
opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text

210. Cohen Committee Report, supra note 6 at 66, n 17 (“Mr. Hayes, while agreeing with these
conclusions and recommendations, would have wished the recommendations to go further
by excluding truth as a defence”).
211. Troper, supra note 12 at 210.
212. See House of Commons Debates, 28-2, vol 1 (17 November 1969) at 87 (Mr Turner); House of
Commons Debates, 28-2, vol 6 (13 April 1970) at 5807 [House of Commons Debates, vol 6].
213. See Senate Debates, 28-2, vol 2 (16 April 1970) at 881-82 (Hon Muriel McQ Fergusson);
Kaplan, supra note 4 at 259-64.

416

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

or intended to point out, for purposes of removal, matters producing or tending
to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group.214
Debate over the bill was intense. Most controversial was the section on
group libel.215 Criticism centred on two points: first, that the bill was too great an
infringement on freedom of speech;216 second, that the legislation would prove
ineffective as a tool for combating hatred. Two leading academics, F.R. Scott
and Harry Arthurs, emphasized the latter argument. Scott contended that the
bill provided “a false sense of security” but would not attack the root causes
of racism; as he stated, “[W]e are making a gesture on the criminal law side
and then everything else goes on as before.”217 Arthurs, who had resigned from
the JPRC’s Legal Committee in part over its shifting views on group libel,218
became one of the legislation’s most convincing opponents. Among other things,
he argued that the criminal law was a suboptimal instrument for countering
hateful speech and that emphasis on criminal sanctions would discourage other,
more useful measures, such as education.219 Arthurs’s testimony had a powerful
impact; it was cited several times by opponents of the bill in the bitter legislative
debate that followed.220
The response of the legislation’s proponents to the first argument was that
freedom of speech is not absolute and that the bill had been carefully tailored to

214. The bill went through other changes. “Religion” was added to the definition of “identifiable
group”; the definition of “statements” was expanded to include electronic recordings; the
word “means” was substituted for “includes” in the definition section of the genocide
provision; the word “contempt” was deleted from the offence of wilful promotion of hatred;
and communication facilities were exempted from in rem proceedings under s 267C.
215. Kaplan, supra note 4 at 263; Cohen, “Reflections on a Controversy,” supra note 8 at 112.
216. See e.g. Senate Debates, 28-1, vol 2 (17 June 1969) at 1615 (Daniel A Lang) [Senate Debates
vol 2]; House of Commons Debates, vol 6, supra note 212 at 5532 (Eldon M Woolliams).
217. Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 28-1, vol 1,
No 9 (29 April 1969) at 206-07 (Prof Scott).
218. Arthurs Interview, supra note 123.
219. Ibid; Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 28-1, vol 1,
No 7 (22 April 1969) at 146-47 (Prof Arthurs). Part of Arthurs’s evidence was also published.
See HW Arthurs, “Hate propaganda – an argument against attempts to stop it by legislation”
(1970) 18 Chitty’s LJ 1.
220. See e.g. House of Commons Debates vol 6, supra note 212 at 5543 (Eldon M Woolliams);
House of Commons Debates, 28-2, vol 6 (9 April 1970) at 5687 (Paul St Pierre); Senate
Debates, 28-2, vol 2 (21 April 1970) at 895 (Hon Lionel Choquette).
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restrict speech as little as possible.221 The answer to the second was that the bill’s
effectiveness was to be found in its pedagogical and symbolic functions, not in
its utility as a prosecutorial tool. To the legislation’s supporters, the opponents
had missed the point. As Cohen put it in an article he published shortly after
the legislation was enacted, the provisions would serve a useful purpose simply
through their enactment:
[T]he Committee took into account the important criticism aimed generally at any
such controls, namely that such legislation cannot change the human heart and that
fundamentally change must come from within and that the most formidable enemy
of prejudice was education and not punitive criminal law. As a general proposition,
the Committee accepted this broad concept of the basic role of the educational
process, and of the social environment in general, as the more desirable framework
within which to alter and control “patterns of prejudice.” But it could not reject the
double conclusion to which it came, namely that many of the community’s most
important self-educating values were enshrined in statements of criminal law and
these in turn, once so enacted, had a continuing educational effect by their very
formulation.222

Numerous parliamentarians similarly placed emphasis on the criminal law’s
symbolic and educative power. As Minister of Justice John Turner argued, to view
the legislation as merely a penal sanction was to take an overly narrow view of the
criminal law’s objectives:
The criminal law is not merely a sanction or control process. It is reflective and
declaratory of the moral sense of a community and the total integrity of a community.
It seeks not merely to proscribe, but to educate.…I make no prediction as to how
successful this legislation is going to be; I would be a fool to try to do it and so would
any other member. [It] is a conscientious attempt on the part of the government…
to outlaw as an articulation of the total integrity of the Canadian community the
dissemination of hate in this country and throughout the world, proclaiming our
commitment to humanity, humanism and to the rule of law.223

221. See e.g. Senate, Special Committee on the Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda), Evidence,
27-2, vol 1, No 2 (29 February 1968) at 43-44, 49-50 (Prof Maxwell Cohen) [Special
Committee on the Criminal Code, vol 1, No 2]; Senate Debates vol 2, supra note 216 at
1610 (Mr Roebuck); Paul Martin, “Right to Live Without Fear,” Canadian Jewish Notes
(29 May 1970) 1.
222. Cohen, “Reflections on a Controversy,” supra note 8 at 109.
223. House of Commons Debates vol 6, supra note 212 at 5557-58 (Mr Turner).
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B. “THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF FEELING THAT THIS IS A JEWISH BILL”:
CONGRESS EFFORTS TO SECURE PASSAGE OF THE LEGISLATION

Despite years of reluctance to accept a group libel bill, Congress embraced the
Cohen Committee’s report and threw its weight behind the proposed legislation.
Congress created a legislative planning committee, headed by a prominent
Toronto lawyer, John Geller, and worked diligently to have the legislation passed.
CJC leadership sought to counter any impression that it was acting
out of self-interest or that hate speech was only a matter of Jewish concern.
Congress hired an Ottawa-based consultant, R. Alex Sim, to lobby MPs and
report back inside information. Sim held himself out as the chairman of the
“Committee on Citizen Rights,” likely to conceal his ties to the CJC when it
was beneficial to do so.224 He attended parliamentary debates in Ottawa and
travelled the country, attending public meetings on the legislation and talking to
politicians and community groups.225 Sim was given other tasks, such as writing
letters to the editor to major newspapers around the country—in his capacity
as chairman of the Committee on Citizen Rights—expressing support for the
bill and countering arguments against the legislation.226 In addition, he liaised
with non-Jewish organizations, whom Congress wanted to get on board so as to
provide the legislation with a broad base of support.227
224. Note, however, that it is not clear whether Sim created this organization for purposes of this
campaign or whether it was already in existence.
225. See e.g. Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Saul Hayes re Report on planning committee meeting (15
January 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52) [Report
on planning committee]; Letter from Alex Sim to Ben Kayfetz (14 February 1968), Toronto,
Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 56); Letter from Alex Sim to Ben
Kayfetz (29 April 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52).
226. Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Saul Hayes (12 June 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52); Letter from Alex Sim to Ben Kayfetz (20 June 1968),
Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 53); R Alex Sim, “Kennedy
assassination shows need for anti-hate law,” Letter to the Editor, Toronto Daily Star (15 June
1968) 6; R Alex Sim, “Time for a bill,” Toronto Telegram (29 June 1968), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 53).
227. See e.g. Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Alex Sim (30 December 1967), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 56); Letter from Alex Sim to Walter Deiter, Canadian
Indian Brotherhood (16 February 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series
5-4-6, File 52); Letter from John Geller to Alex Sim (26 January 1968), Toronto, Ontario
Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 56); Memorandum from R Alex Sim to Ben
Kayfetz re Further action on Bill S-5 (16 February 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52) [Memorandum from Sim to Kayfetz on Bill S-5]; Letter
from Alex Sim to Ben Kayfetz (11 April 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17,
Series 5-4-6, File 52).

Grad, A Gesture of Criminal Law 419

Congress worked hard to secure the backing of a wide assortment of minority
and special interest groups. It forwarded relevant material to these organizations
and offered to draft a brief for anyone who requested it.228 Several of the groups
solicited by Congress testified in support of the bill. Indeed, most, if not all,
of the groups who testified in favour of the legislation were affiliated with the
Jewish community or had been approached by Congress.229 Other organizations
issued public statements which Congress could cite in its own testimony—as
“spontaneous” endorsements—to argue that “a groundswell of opinion across
Canada” favoured the legislation.230
228. Report on planning committee, supra note 225; Letter from Louis Herman to Richard Jones
(19 January 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 56).
229. According to the Hansard Index, witnesses who testified in support of the legislation were
as follows: The CJC (29 February 1968 and 25 February 1969); National Council of Jewish
Women (29 February 1968); United Organizations for Histadrut (29 February 1968) (note
that the National Council of Jewish Women and the United Organizations for Histadrut
appeared alongside the Congress on 29 February 1968); Maxwell Cohen (29 February 1968
and 1 May 1969); Jewish Labor Committee of Canada (11 March 1969); United Nations
Association of Canada (11 March 1969); Canadian Labour Congress (18 March 1968);
Mark MacGuigan (18 March 1969); Canadian Council of Christians and Jews (25 March
1969); Association of Holocaust Survivors (25 March 1969); Manitoba Human Rights
Association (22 April 1969); Canadian Polish Congress (24 April 1969); and United Black
Front (30 April 1969).
Several of the nominally non-Jewish groups had ties to the Jewish community. For example,
the United Nations Association was represented by Justice Harry Batshaw, who in 1950
became the first Jew appointed to a Superior Court in Canada and was active on Jewish
community issues. See Canadian Jewish Heritage Network, “Batshaw, Justice Harry” (last
visited 6 February 2022), online: <www.cjhn.ca/en/permalink/cjhn88127>. The Canadian
Council of Christians and Jews was created with Congress assistance, which initially
provided its entire funding. See Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Max Melamet (22 January
1959), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 6). The delegation
from the Manitoba Human Rights Association was led by Melvin Fenson, a Jewish lawyer
from Winnipeg, Congress member, and formerly the long-time editor of Winnipeg’s Jewish
Post. See Allan Levine, Coming of Age: A History of the Jewish People of Manitoba (Heartland
Associates, 2009) at 216.
In addition, the CJC lobbied the Canadian Polish Congress to support the legislation and
wrote a brief on their behalf. Although it is not clear whether the CJC also approached the
United Black Front, internal correspondence from January 1968 indicates that its planning
committee was reaching out to “Negro groups.” See Report on planning committee,
supra note 225.
230. Special Committee on the Criminal Code, vol 1, No 2, supra note 221 at 34 (Mr
Harris); Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence,
28-1, vol 1, No 2 (25 February 1969) at 41 (Mr Abbey) [Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs No 2].
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The CJC’s concern over not appearing self-interested was well-founded.
James Harper Prowse, chairman of the Senate committee on Bill S-5, reported
to Sim in February 1968 that there was “a good deal of feeling [in the Senate]
that this is a Jewish bill”; Prowse was thus grateful when Sim brought him a
list of non-Jewish organizations that Congress had been in touch with, which
Prowse thought “would make a tremendous difference in the attitude of the
committee members.”231 However, legislators continued to display anti-Semitic
attitudes during the debates. Senator Lionel Choquette suggested that the Jewish
community was trying to “shove this type of legislation down people’s throats”232
and that Jewish witnesses were prejudiced.233 Senator David Walker queried
whether anyone supported the bill other than the Congress.234 Other legislators
used language that invoked stereotypes of the “pathological Jew” who derived
“pleasure in raising the alarm of imminent danger and in producing a perpetual
and paranoid status of victimhood.”235
Congress engaged in other lobbying efforts. It was in contact with Mark
MacGuigan, who had served on the Cohen Committee as a law professor and
was elected as a Liberal MP in 1968.236 Kayfetz asked MacGuigan to analyze the
arguments being made against the bill, in exchange for which Kayfetz promised
him “a suitable honorarium.”237 MacGuigan published two academic articles
and at least one editorial in support of the legislation, and testified before the
Senate.238 In addition, the CJC sent letters to candidates in advance of the 1968
federal election requesting their support and had local representatives approach

231. Memorandum from Sim to Kayfetz on Bill S-5, supra note 227.
232. Special Committee on the Criminal Code, vol 1, No 2, supra note 221 at 24
(Senator Choquette).
233. Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 28-1, vol 1,
No 5 (18 March 1969) at 94 (Senator Choquette).
234. Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs No 2, supra note 230 at 43 (Senator Walker).
235. Lunny, supra note 19 at 41, 58.
236. Cyril Levitt recalled that MacGuigan also came to speak to the CANC about the legislation
and the Cohen Committee’s work, although Levitt could not recall when exactly this took
place. Levitt Interview, supra note 163.
237. Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Mark MacGuigan (21 March 1967), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archive (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 42); Bialystok, supra note 5 at 165.
238. MacGuigan, “Hate Control,” supra note 11; MacGuigan, “Bill S-5 and the Cohen
Report,” supra note 11.
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candidates in person.239 As the legislative process dragged on, Congress lobbied
MPs, influential senators, and high-ranking members of the Liberal government.240
In September and October 1969, Congress had a number of discussions with
Trudeau and Turner and was able to secure a commitment that the government
would introduce the anti-hate bill early in the upcoming legislative session and
secure its passage—promises that the government kept.241
C. “WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO OPPOSE ANY LAW SO FULL OF
LOOPHOLES AND ESCAPE CLAUSES”: SURVIVORS’ DISSATISFACTION
WITH THE LEGISLATION

The CJC testified twice before Senate committees considering the legislation:
first, on 29 February 1968, before the committee on Bill S-5; and again on
25 February 1969, before the committee on Bill S-21.
In its February 1968 testimony, echoing its prior legislative campaigns,
Congress took a position that offered the greatest opportunity to ensure the bill’s
enactment. Sydney Harris told the committee that Congress fully agreed with the
defences to wilful promotion of hatred contained in the draft legislation; in fact,
Harris emphasized, the CJC would go further and “oppose legislation that [did]
not have these built-in safeguards to protect the full and free debate of social issues
centering on the uninhibited discussion of controversial social issues.”242 Notably,
Congress did not adopt Hayes’s dissenting position in the Cohen Committee
report opposing the defence of truth.243 Moreover, the Congress delegation
encouraged the Senate to consider introducing an additional hurdle, that no
prosecution be commenced without the attorney general’s consent—a suggestion
239. See e.g. Letter from Ben Kayfetz to Saul Hayes, supra note 226; Letter from Andrew Brewin
to Sydney Harris (13 June 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6,
File 53); Letter from Ben Kayfetz to John Geller (14 June 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish
Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52); Letter from Sydney Harris & Louis Herman
(17‑June 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52); Letter
from John Geller to members of Legislative Planning Committee (24 October 1969),
Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52).
240. See e.g. Letter from John Geller to members of Legislative Planning Committee, supra
note 239; Letter from John Geller (26 November 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52); Letter from Philip Givens to Ben Kayfetz (22 April 1970),
Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 66).
241. Letter from John Geller to members of Legislative Planning Committee (9 October 1969),
Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives (Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 53).
242. Special Committee on the Criminal Code, vol 1, No 2, supra note 221 at 32 (Mr Harris)
[emphasis added].
243. See ibid. Congress explicitly approved of this defence.
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the Senate ultimately gave effect to.244 Since requirement of the attorney general’s
consent has discouraged use of the legislation, it is surprising in hindsight that
the CJC would go out of its way to propose this provision.245 The same is true of
Congress’s approval of the statute’s generous defences.246
Congress’s attitude can be explained by its goal of overcoming opposition
to the bill and its optimism that the legislation would not need to be used.
As Fred Catzman testified, “[I]f this legislation were enacted we would be bitterly
disappointed if we found it necessary to have to resort to the courts to enforce
it.”247 Congress envisioned that the law would have a powerful symbolic and
deterrent impact: “that the very enactment of such a law as a declaration of policy
would have the salutary effect of making citizens aware that these are taboos
they shouldn’t engage in.”248 As Kayfetz wrote after the legislation was enacted,
Jewish leadership felt that the anti-hate bill would not “eliminate or even outlaw
the bulk of antisemitic material that is circulated.” Rather, “just as [with] the
244. See Cohen Committee Report, supra note 6 at 71. The Committee flagged the possibility of
requiring the consent of the federal or provincial attorney general to initiate a prosecution
but took no position and did not include such a provision in its proposed legislation. The
government’s draft legislation contained this prerequisite only for in rem proceedings.
The CJC's testimony regarding the attorney general’s consent was somewhat equivocal, but
it raised the issue on its own initiative and made clear that it endorsed such a requirement.
In both its 1968 and 1969 testimony, Congress quoted passages from a speech by Chief
Justice Dalton Wells of the Ontario High Court of Justice advocating to mandate the
attorney general’s consent out of concern for freedom of speech. In addition, in 1968
(but not 1969), the delegation added the following testimony: “It may well be that Chief
Justice Wells’ suggestion as to an Attorney General’s fiat being a condition precedent to a
prosecution is one which should be given effect to.” See Special Committee on the Criminal
Code, vol 1, No 2, supra note 221 at 33 (Mr Harris).
During the 1968 Senate hearing, in response to a question from Senator Arthur Roebuck—
expressing concern about the practicality of requiring the attorney general’s consent—the
Congress delegation clarified that it “felt obliged to point out to the committee that Chief
Justice Wells made this suggestion [but it did] not feel in any way the bill would be defective
unless [the] suggestion were given effect to.” See Special Committee on the Criminal Code,
vol 1, No 2, supra note 221 at 42 (Mr Geller). Nevertheless, as noted, Congress quoted the
same passage from Chief Justice Wells when it appeared before the Senate one year later. See
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs No 2, supra note 230 at 39 (Mr Abbey).
245. Kaplan, supra note 4 at 267; Moon, supra note 3 at 25; Craig S MacMillan, Myron G
Claridge & Rick McKenna, “Criminal Proceedings as a Response to Hate: The British
Columbia Experience” (2002) 45 Crim LQ 419 at 446.
246. MacMillan, Claridge & McKenna, supra note 245 at 443 (statutory defences under s 319(2)
have made investigation and prosecution of hate speech more challenging).
247. Special Committee on the Criminal Code, vol 1, No 2, supra note 221 at 40 (Mr
Fred M Catzman).
248. Ibid.

Grad, A Gesture of Criminal Law 423

anti-discrimination laws on the provincial level,” it was hoped that the law would
improve “the climate of opinion.”249
The Association of Holocaust Survivors was unhappy with Congress’s position.
It was concerned that the legislation was too weak and would prove ineffective.
Among other things, the survivors wanted the defences to wilful promotion of
hatred eliminated. Paul Goldstein, the Association’s president, accused Congress
of displaying “a flagrant disregard for the Community’s feelings and interest.”250
In Goldstein’s view, the CJC was hijacking the bill and prioritizing the rights of
Nazis over their victims:
It is clear that the same civil liberty advocated in the Jewish leadership who were so
instrumental in muzzling the demands of the Jewish Community for effective group
libel legislation in the past, are back in business again.
Let us not forget that the only reason the Congress is fighting for a group libel bill is
because of the demands of the Jewish Community, spearheaded by the Association of
Survivors and won by an overwhelming majority at the last plenary session in 1965.
These leaders didn’t want the bill in the first place! And now they are fighting in
a manner which would make the proposed legislation permanently ineffective!251

Congress did not back down. Hayes called Goldstein way out of line and accused
him of not understanding the proposed legislation.252 In an internal memo,
Geller deemed Goldstein’s criticism “a completely dishonest attack not only on
the intelligence of those of us engaged in the promotion of Bill S5 (which is
fair) but on our honesty.”253 As Geller explained, the CJC position was carefully
considered in order to “establish the bona fides of the Jewish community on the
question of freedom of speech” so as to appeal to the legislation’s opponents.254
He added in a subsequent correspondence, “We might be able to deal with our
enemies but God protect us from our friends.”255

249. Kayfetz, “The story behind,” supra note 11 at 8.
250. Paul Goldstein, “Bill to curb hate mongers has too many loopholes,” Canadian Jewish
Chronicle (29 March 1968) 5.
251. Ibid.
252. Ibid.
253. Letter from John Geller to Saul Hayes (2 April 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52).
254. Ibid.
255. Letter from John Geller to Saul Hayes (3 April 1968), Toronto, Ontario Jewish Archives
(Fonds 17, Series 5-4-6, File 52).
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When it testified again one year later, Congress presented a virtually identical
brief.256 This time, the Association of Holocaust Survivors also testified. The
Association repeated its critiques—that the legislation had too many loopholes
and that the defences should be deleted.257 The survivors were not well-received.
Much of the criticism directed against them came from David Croll, the only
Jewish senator and himself a member of Congress. As he remarked in frustration:
The government has presented this bill. The Government wants a bill. You have got
ten or a dozen lawyers and other people here who know more than lawyers. This is
not an exercise for us. The intention is to get a bill that works. So…you [can] give
us that much credit.258

Faced with a hostile reception, Goldstein conceded that the Association did not
wish to jeopardize the legislation’s passage, and “would be quite satisfied to see Bill
S-21 adopted in its present form and to let its efficacy be tested by the courts.”259

V. CONCLUSION
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to criticize the Canadian Jewish
Congress for its approach to the hate-speech legislation. Such criticism might
centre on two areas.
First, Congress often comes across as insensitive to the Holocaust survivors.
As neo-Nazism gained momentum in the early 1960s—only two decades after the
murder of six million Jews—Canadian-Jewish leadership downplayed the threat
and held steadfast to its civil-libertarian position. Only when the CJC’s legitimacy
was threatened did it finally change course and permit broader representation in
determining its approach to neo-Nazism. By this time, the relationship between
the survivor community and leadership was extremely strained: “a full and bitter
cup,” as Sabina Citron put it after Congress’s tone-deaf response to the riot at
Allan Gardens. But even when it threw its support behind a group libel bill,
the CJC disregarded the survivors’ protests that the bill would be difficult to
implement. History has proven the survivors correct.
Second, Congress’s failure to endorse the Klein-Walker and Orlikow bills
may have squandered its best opportunity to secure a stronger law. In 1964,
256. See Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs No 2, supra note 230 at
31-42 (Mr Abbey).
257. Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 28-1, vol 1,
No 6 (25 March 1969) at 129 (Mr Goldstein).
258. Ibid at 129 (Mr Croll).
259. Ibid at 129 (Mr Goldstein).
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when these bills were introduced, neo-Nazism was ascendant and appeared
well-coordinated. All major parties were on record as supporting some form
of anti-hate legislation.260 In the House of Commons, Diefenbaker repeatedly
pressed the government to take steps to stem the flow of hate literature.261
According to the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, even the Social Credit Party
and the Creditistes had promised to “vote for a law with teeth to curb hate
propaganda.”262 However, by the time Congress got on board with the legislation
and the Liberal bill slowly worked its way through Parliament, neo-Nazism had
subsided, handing its opponents a powerful argument against the legislation.
In addition, Diefenbaker was replaced by Robert Stanfield in 1967, and the PCs
ultimately opposed the bill.263
But persuasive arguments can be marshalled in Congress’s defence. For
example, the legislation it obtained was arguably the best it could get. As noted,
Hayes asserted in 1964 that the CJC did not lend its support to the Klein-Walker
bill in part because the bill had no chance of passage. If this is true—and we have
no proof that it is not—it is difficult to fault Congress for not supporting it.
Moreover, once it got behind a group libel bill, the effort put forth by Congress
was indispensable to securing the legislation. It drew heavily on its resources,
prestige, and contacts inside and, especially, outside of the Jewish community.
The Cohen Committee, which led to the hate-speech legislation, was created at
the CJC’s initiative. Once the government tabled legislation, Congress ramped
up lobbying in favour of the bill—including by hiring a lobbyist and working
tirelessly to build up a broad base of support among non-Jewish groups, which
proved vital to overcoming opposition. In accepting the bill despite its weaknesses,
Congress was surely correct that its best chance at obtaining the legislation was
by not asking for more than the government could give. To do otherwise would
risk ending up with nothing.
It also bears emphasizing that Congress’s careful approach ensured the
legislation was eventually determined to be constitutional. In deeming section
319(2) of the Criminal Code a reasonable limit on freedom of expression pursuant
260. See e.g. “NDP Head Hopes for Legislation that Will Stop Hate Propaganda,” Canadian
Jewish Chronicle (5 March 1965) 1; “Diefenbaker Says Conservatives Will Support Law
Against Hate,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (12 March 1965) 1.
261. See House of Commons Debates, 26-2, vol 1 (10 March 1964) at 732 (Right Hon
JG Diefenbaker).
262. Max Bookman, “Dateline Ottawa,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle (7 May 1965) 6.
263. See House of Commons Debates vol 6, supra note 212 at 5530-33 (Mr Eldon M Woolliams).
The Progressive Conservatives supported the genocide provision but opposed the rest of the
bill. Despite the party’s official position, several Conservative MPs voted for the legislation.

426

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

to section 1 of the Charter, a one-vote majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Keegstra cited the wide defences afforded to those accused of wilful promotion
of hatred, which “significantly reduced” the “danger…that s. 319(2) is overbroad
or unduly vague.”264 The majority was also impressed with the “particularly
strong” Cohen Committee.265 Although Congress could not have predicted
the language of the Charter, it deserves credit for indirectly anticipating how
much of an inroad into freedom of speech the Court would ultimately accept.
Furthermore, the closely-divided panel and the reasoning of the Court in Keegstra
signals that a stronger bill—one absent the broad defences that the survivors
found objectionable—would almost certainly have been struck down.
On account of the rise in hate speech over the last half-decade and the
limited use of the legislation since its enactment, it is tempting to interpret the
story of the criminalization of hate speech as a cautionary tale of the symbolic
use of the criminal law. Arthurs, for example, calls the hate-speech legislation
“an empty symbol” on account of its seldom invocation and apparently minimal
deterrent effect.266
Arthurs is correct that the legislation has proved mainly symbolic. Indeed,
as this article has shown, the legislation’s proponents saw the law’s symbolism as
its primary aim. But this does not make the symbol an empty one. In fact, the
contrary is true: the history of the hate-speech legislation recounted here reveals
the fecundity of its symbolism. For people like Turner and Cohen, the law bore
the important message that Canada was a multicultural society where racism
and xenophobia were abhorrent. For the Canadian Jewish community and
other minority groups, the legislation symbolized that they were equal citizens
and that the government would protect them from discrimination. For the
Holocaust survivors, the bill symbolized that Jewish leadership was at last willing
to acknowledge their feelings and—at least tepidly—permit them to enter the
CJC's inner circle and influence its policy.
Arthurs’s view of the legislation as a hollow symbol echoes the opinion of
those who argue the law has failed because of the low number of prosecutions
and convictions. But the rich symbolism of the legislation suggests that we need
to broaden our measure of the legislation’s effectiveness to accord with the actual
goals of the bill. Irrespective of the number of prosecutions, the hate-speech
legislation arguably does stand as an important symbol that we live in a cultural
mosaic where hate speech and neo-Nazism are considered deviant and contrary
264. Keegstra, supra note 10 at 779.
265. Ibid at 724-25.
266. Arthurs Interview, supra note 123.
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to Canadian values. Moreover, although manifestly difficult to quantify,
it is certainly possible that the legislation has had an educative and deterrent
impact through its very formulation, as envisioned by Turner, Cohen, and others.
And, as Turner argued in Parliament, to view the criminal law as merely a penal
sanction is to take an overly restrictive view of the objectives of criminal justice.267
Yet, notwithstanding this defence of Congress and the legislation it obtained,
the CJC did fail in what was perhaps the principal symbolism of its advocacy for a
hate speech bill: that Canada’s Jews stood united in the fight against anti-Semitism.
This is because the Holocaust survivors did not share Congress’s view of the
legislation as purely symbolic. They wanted a bill that could be used to prosecute
neo-Nazis. They were deeply concerned with the legislation’s weaknesses and
argued in vain that Congress should press for a stronger law. By supporting a
weakened bill, the CJC ensured that community tensions would persist in the
years to come, as neo-Nazism and Holocaust denial gained adherents and the
legislation proved challenging to invoke. That, too, is an important story, which
I leave for another day.

267. Indeed, this is perhaps especially true in the context of hate crime legislation. See e.g. James B
Jacobs, “Implementing Hate Crime Legislation Symbolism and Crime Control” (1992) 1992
Ann Surv Am L 541.

